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Recent advances in the neuroscience of episodic memory provide a framework
to integrate object relations theory, a psychoanalytic model of mind development,
with potential neural mechanisms. Object relations are primordial cognitive-affective
units of the mind derived from survival- and safety-level experiences with caretakers
during phase-sensitive periods of infancy and toddlerhood. Because these are learning
experiences, their neural substrate likely involves memory, here affect-enhanced episodic
memory. Inaugural object relations are encoded by the hippocampus-amygdala synaptic
plasticity, and systems-consolidated by medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). Self- and
object-mental representations, extracted from these early experiences, are at first
dichotomized by contradictory affects evoked by frustrating and rewarding interactions
(“partial object relations”). Such affective dichotomization appears to be genetically
hardwired the amygdala. Intrinsic propensity of mPFC to form schematic frameworks
for episodic memories may pilot non-conscious integration of dichotomized mental
representations in neonates and infants. With the emergence of working memory in
toddlers, an activated self- and object-representation of a particular valence can be
juxtaposed with its memorized opposites creating a balanced cognitive-affective frame
(conscious “integration of object relations”). Specific events of object relations are
forgotten but nevertheless profoundly influence the mental future of the individual, acting
(i) as implicit schema-affect templates that regulate attentional priorities, relevance, and
preferential assimilation of new information based on past experience, and (ii) as basic
units of experience that are, under normal circumstances, integrated as attractors or
“focal points” for interactive self-organization of functional brain networks that underlie the
mind. A failure to achieve integrated object relations is predictive of poor adult emotional
and social outcomes, including personality disorder. Cognitive, cellular-, and systemsneuroscience of episodic memory appear to support key postulates of object relations
theory and help elucidate neural mechanisms of psychodynamic psychotherapy. Derived
through the dual prism of psychoanalysis and neuroscience, the gained insights may
offer new directions to enhance mental health and improve treatment of multiple forms
of psychopathology.
Keywords: object relations, molecular- and systems-neuroscience, trans-disciplinary integration, emotionenhanced episodic memory, systems-consolidation of memory, cognitive neuroscience

1

March 2021 | Volume 12 | Article 583743

Svrakic and Zorumski

Neuroscience of Object Relations

INTRODUCTION

in psychotherapy, and (iii) capitalize on enhanced plasticity in
the developing human brain for early correction and possibly
prevention of multiple forms of psychopathology.

For decades, the sole empirical support for object relations
theory, a psychoanalytic metapsychology about the development
of the human mind, was the effectiveness of psychodynamic
psychotherapy, derived from this theory, in the treatment of
pathological object relations in personality disorder. Here, our
main hypotheses are that (i) cellular- and systems-neuroscience
provide insights that may help integrate object relations
theory and neural mechanisms of systems-consolidation and
semanticization of affect-enhanced episodic memories derived
from early interactive experiences with caretakers, and (ii)
cognitive neuroscience provides insights that may explain the
emergence of the sense of self from engramized autobiographical
memories. Although mechanistic studies have been done
mainly in rodents, and this is a significant limitation, the
processes being studied involve homologous brain systems and
fundamental neural functions that are shared with humans,
making them potentially informative for understanding human
emotion and episodic memory. Studies of contextual fear
conditioning in rodents, a form of affect-enhanced episodiclike memory (Eichenbaum, 2017; Tonegawa et al., 2018),
combine recombinant DNA and optogenetics to delineate a
cascade of cellular- and system-level neural events involved in
encoding and long-term consolidation of episodic memories
(Kitamura et al., 2017). In humans, functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) with multivariate pattern-analyses
(van Kesteren et al., 2016) or electrophysiological recordings
(Siapas et al., 2005) are used to study distributed cortical and
subcortical patterns of brain activity involved in generalization
of episodic memories into associated knowledge structures or
schemas. The plastic hippocampus-amygdala-mPFC circuitry
is currently best described but future studies will likely add
other circuits to the neuroscience of object relations and,
generally, the organizational infrastructure of the human mind.
Beck’s cognitive theory (Beck, 2011) is consistent with modern
neuroscience of the formation and self-reinforcing expansion of
schematic frameworks of episodic memories (Tse et al., 2011;
van Kesteren et al., 2016). Here, we integrate Beck’s concept of
core beliefs into the continuum of widening cognitive-affective
templates for interpreting new experience, piloted by object
relations and finalized into neocortical schemas. The templates
are characterized by initially strong amygdala involvement,
with time increasingly framed by cognitive processing, but
are never purely emotional or purely rational. Beck’s cognitive
model, however, does not account for the preconceptual
psychopathology of partial (unintegrated) object relations of
personality disorder. We also draw from the higher order theory
of emotional consciousness (HOTEC) (LeDoux and Brown,
2017) to account for mental differentiation between one’s own self
and the object world, a major milestone in mind development.
Trans-disciplinary integrations are heuristic models that involve
at least some informed speculation, which can be tested through
epistemic iterations as knowledge and technology advance.
The transdisciplinary model presented here offers testable
directions in research to (i) enhance healthy plasticity in critical
neurocircuits to promote well-being, (ii) activate this plasticity
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Object Relations Theory: The Basics
Klein (1935, 1946) observed that infants manifest an immediate
deep bond with caretakers, usually the mother, and that these
early interactions mediate and modulate mind development.
Klein’s theorizing challenged Freud’s “drive/structure” model
(Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983), whereby innate sexual- and
aggressive drives mediate the development of intrapsychic
structures1 . This challenge marked the birth of object relations
theory, a departure from classical psychoanalysis albeit still
rooted in its main postulates, the dual-drive theory and the
tripartite, Id, Ego, and Superego structure of the mind. Over the
years, the theory has evolved into its present form. Fairbairn
(1952) considered the innate need for emotional attachment
to an object (“object relatedness”), to be the driving force
behind mind organization, rather than pleasure-seeking as the
goal to itself. This is known as the “relational/structure model”
(Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983)2 , whereby “the interpersonal and
the intrapsychic realms create. . . .each other” (Mitchell, 1988,
p. 9), a major departure from Freudian psychoanalysis. Egopsychologists, while still holding that libido and aggression
drive the differentiation of the mind, make several major
contributions to object relations theory. Hartmann (1950) and
Jacobson (1964) explain the formation of self-representations in
the mind, hitherto unaccounted for by Klein, who uses the terms
“ego” and “self ” interchangeably. Hartmann (1950) and Jacobson
(1964) also revise Freud’s dual-drive theory, which paves the
way to integrate unconditioned affects (as defined by Panksepp,
2011) in mind development. Finally, Hartmann (1950), Fairbairn
(1952), and Jacobson (1964) re-conceptualize object relations
insofar that what the infant internalizes is not an image of the
object, a position long held by Mitchell (1981), but rather the
interactive experience with the object. This revision provides the
framework for understanding object relations through the prism
of episodic memory, the main focus of this work. Kernberg
(1975) further advances the integration of ego-psychology, affect
theory, and object relations theory, revolutionizes the concept of
personality disorder (Kernberg, 1975), and pioneers work on the
neurobiological correlates of object relations (Kernberg, 2014).
An object relation is defined as a primordial cognitiveaffective unit of the mind derived from early interactive
experiences with significant objects, usually the mother3 , during
phase-sensitive periods of infancy and toddlerhood. An object
relation consists of three components: a self-representation,
an object-representation, and a representation of an affectively
charged interactive experience (Auchincloss and Samberg, 2012).
1 The term “subsystems” rather than intrapsychic “structures” are used in this work,
as there are no bona fide structures in the mind, which is entirely a function.
2 Fairbairn’s “relational/structure” model positing that relational experience with
caretakers modulates the structure of the mind, played a key role in the
development of Bowlby’s attachment theory.
3 In a broader sense, a significant object is anyone or anything into whom/which
one invests strong emotions: a romantic partner, work, an idea, religion, social
activism, etc.
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The affective valence of the interaction is modulated by the
neonate’s heritable affect-reactivity and/or quality of caretaking.
The most influential object relations are those acquired during
the first 2 to 3 years-of-life, in the setting of helplessness
and a powerful mediating object. In such a setting, interoand exteroceptive sensations of distress or comfort activate
subcortical survival circuits and primary affects and thus
narrowly evoke an unconditioned sense of either a threat to or
affirmation of own survival and safety. Primary affects, negative
(fear, rage, separation distress) and positive (lust, care, play,
seeking) can be conceived as intrinsic brain’s value systems
that automatically and unconditionally inform animals in real
time just how well they are faring in survival, sometimes called
“emotional learning”4 (Panksepp, 2011). Specifically, positive
affects appear to index “comfort zones” that support survival,
while negative affects inform about circumstances that may
endanger survival; both mediate anticipation of potential safety
or danger and, ultimately, increase adaptive fitness of the
organism. Emotional learning is a form of implicit memory
formed and stored by the brain’s emotional memory system
(Phelps and LeDoux, 2005). In neonates, the amygdala takes
the lead in such emotional learning, but the hippocampus
(encoding the semantic-like valence of an event – “aversive”
or “rewarding,” not in itself an affect) and mPFC (the thickest
region of the PFC at birth, involved in affective processing
(reviewed in Hodel, 2018) are also likely involved. The mPFC is
activated when mother’s speech is directed toward the neonate
but stays inactive when the speech is directed toward another
adult (Saito et al., 2007) suggestive of early mPFC involvement.
In other words, even the earliest experiences may be schematized
into implicit schema-affect5 complexes. The memories of early
object relations are forgotten as specific events but (i) implicitly
regulate the relevance and preferential assimilation of new
experience as it is being processed by the hippocampus-amygdala
dependent learning (Tse et al., 2011), and (ii) represent basic
building units, called focal points or attractors, around which
functional connectivity networks that underlie the mind selforganize. The trajectories of such interactive self-organization
differ significantly as a function of the net-affective valence of
experience acquired during phase sensitive formative periods.
Predominantly positive experiences facilitate normal brain/mind
development (Kolb et al., 2012), while chronic adversity in
many instances may re-direct brain/mind trajectories toward
personality pathology (Teicher and Samson, 2016). Non-linear
self-organizing systems, such as the human brain and mind,
tend to follow trajectories toward stable attractors (here positive
experiences) as optimal solutions that define the stable “state”
of the system. Long before dynamical system theories, Klein

(1946) cogently referred to such points of stability as “focal
points” for continuous mind integration. Chronic stress during
phase sensitive periods affects the organization of prefrontal
cortex (PFC) and mPFC (Teicher and Samson, 2016; Czeh et al.,
2018), and hippocampus (Luby et al., 2013), likely via epigenetic
heightening of the “stress” axis (Dunn et al., 2019). In this
context, negative experiences would represent unstable attractors
providing only unstable solutions to a complex system thus
making it sensitive to minimal internal or external perturbations.
Notwithstanding, cognitive framing of activated primary affects
may be the initiating force behind mind development in humans
(Kernberg, 2014). If so, this process is likely piloted by early
object relations.

THE SOMATOSENSORY AND LIMBIC
ORIGINS OF OBJECT RELATIONS
The Neonate: How Bodily Sensations
Initiate Mind Development
The earliest interactive experiences with caregivers evoke
mainly bodily sensations, exteroceptive (tactile, olfactory,
gustatory), and interoceptive (hunger, pain, thirst, satiety,
comfort). Vision and hearing, the senses that inform about
the environment the most, have yet to fully develop. Brain
systems involved in sensory experiences of one’s own body are
likely involved in social and emotional processes (Marshall
and Meltzoff, 2015). Five-month-old infants manifest implicit
body awareness, a fundamental aspect of social perception, as
indicated by differing temporal lobe activity during real-time vs.
delayed video display of self-initiated face and arm movement;
these brain areas are also implicated in body awareness in
adults (Filippetti et al., 2015). Cortical sensory-motor body
maps might be involved in the basic registration of self–other
correspondences which, in turn, facilitates the elementary
experience of bidirectionality (Marshall and Meltzoff, 2015).
Somatosensory cortices, informed by the insula, brainstem
nuclei, and hypothalamus, likely provide direct substrates of
mental experiences of body states relevant for survival, e.g.,
thirst, pain, hunger (Damasio and Carvalho, 2013). In animals,
such interoceptive sensations mediate the awareness of some
aspects of their own existence (Panksepp, 2011). Evolving
cognitive processes, such as selective attention and recognition
memory (Reynolds and Romano, 2016), may frame sensorymotor body awareness into the experience of physical boundary
with caretakers in cca. 6-month-old infants (aka “self-object
boundary”). This nonconscious physical “I” represents a mental
milestone that delineates the infant’s physical entity through
the sense of agency6 in bidirectional interactions. As Klein
(1935, 1946) theorized, object relations are initiated by bodily
sensations evoked by earliest interactions with caregivers, via
mechanisms of projection and introjection (discussed next).

4 Not to

be confused with operant conditioning.
valence of affect-enhanced episodic memory, not itself an affect
but a factual information whether the event was rewarding or frustrating, is
encoded by the hippocampus as a component of the context; the episode is
systems-consolidated in mPFC (Kitamura et al., 2017). Optogenetic stimulation
and contextual activation of remote episodic memory engram in mPFC activates
respective amygdala-encoded affect memories and behavior (Kitamura et al., 2017)
likely via extensive mPFC-amygdala connections (Reppucci and Petrovich, 2016).
Hence, the phrase “schema-affect complex” is used.

5 Semantic-like

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

6 Defined as the implicit subjective awareness of initiating, executing, and
controlling one’s own volitional actions, usually referring to motor acts and their
consequences.
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BOX 1 | Glossary.

BOX 1 | Continued

• Mind, mental function, psyche, personality. The terms mind, mental
function, and psyche are equivalent as they derive from Latin (mens) and
Greek (ψυχ?) for “mind”. Personality refers to a specific configuration of the
mind in any given individual, a unique ontogenetic outcome of the general
phylogenetic capacity of human beings. Recent functional neuroimaging of
normal subjects (Gratton et al., 2018) shows that functional brain networks
have a stable general structure across individuals and also show unique
and stable individual differences. Individual variation is most pronounced
for top-down control networks, i.e., those that self-organize via interactive
brain/mind development. Elementary topography of the brain’s functional
connectivity networks involved in mental faculties (cognition, emotion, and
motivation) is present at birth (Bruchhage et al., 2020). The networks are
self-organized into spatially segregated but temporally integrated functional
units based on person-specific interactive experiences.

of deeper, nonconscious phantasies (primitive imaginations of love and
aggression with no reality testing). Both phantasy and fantasy have a
structuring influence of self- and object-representations (LeDoux and Brown,
2017).
• Objects in psychoanalysis: real, internal, and external. In
psychoanalysis, the term “object” refers to another person and is
contrasted with the self (Auchincloss and Samberg, 2012). Contemporary
interpersonal-, relational-, and many object-relation theorists use the term
“object” both to refer to another real person and to another person as it
is represented in the mind (Auchincloss and Samberg, 2012). In Kleinian
psychoanalysis, “external object” refers to a mental representation of
another person that is shaped by projection and re-introjection of one’s
inner cognitive-emotional states, and thus may not accurately represent
that person (Auchincloss and Samberg, 2012). “Internal object” refers to
a mental representation of another person that one invests with drives
and affects, aka “significant objects,” whose interactive impact has been
internalized and continues its influence on the mind from within. A complex
interplay continues throughout life between internal objects and those in
the real world as they are represented in one’s mind (Internal Objects,
2011), a somewhat solipsistic but a plausible approach to the reality of
external objects in the mind of the beholder.

• Episodic and semantic memory. Autonoetic and noetic
consciousness. Episodic memory is contextual, i.e., spatial (“where”),
temporal (“when”), and, if applicable, contextual affects evoked by the
event. All episodic memories also contain semantic (factual) information
(“what happened”). Each type of memory represents different parts of
context to form a complete picture. Semantic memory proper refers to
information that is independent of the context in which that information
was acquired, such as factual knowledge. The dynamic relationship
between episodic and semantic memory is discussed throughout this
work. Both classes of memory are explicit (conscious). Episodic memories
are experienced as autonoetic consciousness, i.e., that the episode
happened to the person introspecting his or her memories, only if during
the retrieval process a coordinated interplay of psychological capacities
(e.g., the sense of self, ownership, subjective temporality, and agency)
is integrated into the episode (Klein, 2013). Such involvement of the self
makes episodic memories autobiographical (LeDoux and Brown, 2017);
otherwise, episodic memory would merely be a complex form of semantic
memory (Klein, 2013). Retrieval of semantic memories does not integrate
the sense of self in the recollection and such memories are experienced
as noetic consciousness of factual knowledge.

Phantasy: The Brain’s Innate Code for
Primitive Mental Forms
The first attempt to reify projection in neonates is the concept of
“phantasy.” Klein (1952) postulated that phantasy is embedded
in phylogenetic inheritance and thus predates real experience
(Box 1). Phantasy, so the argument goes, is the innate biological
code that transforms bodily sensations, biological instincts, and
primary affects into a priori mental imagery of the inside and
outside world (Isaacs, 1948). Early phantasies are bound with
bodily sensations and primary affects and these are believed to
modulate phantasy into a specific form of imagery (Isaacs, 1948),
e.g., pain and fear may create the imagery of paranoia, pleasure
the imagery of desire. Phantasy, instincts/affects, and sensations
are theorized to mediate projection insofar as they “bring the
experiencing mind into contact with external reality” (Isaacs,
1948, p. 92). Visual imagery in dreams reported by congenitally
blind individuals (Bértolo et al., 2017) may illustrate phantasy
that predates real experience but may not be equated to phantasy
as the latter involves a priori knowledge beyond visual imagery.
Isaacs (1948) posits that such a priori knowledge may be inherent
in bodily impulses as a vehicle of instinct, in the excitation of an
organ, here the mouth (p. 85).

• Taxonomy of affects, emotions/feelings, and sensations. Affects
are complex psycho-physiological states evoked by real-time or recalled
exteroceptive activation of subcortical survival and reproductive circuits.
Affects consist of subjective conscious experience of emotion, associated
ideas and fantasies, and innate physiologic and behavioral response
patterns (Auchincloss and Samberg, 2012). Feelings and conscious
emotions are interchangeable in our opinion. Interoceptive stimuli,
produced by internal organs or by the hypothalamus, are associated
with physiologic and behavioral responses which restore homeostasis,
consciously experienced as “sensations” of pain, hunger, thirst, etc. The
latter may secondarily activate survival- and affect-circuits.
• Nonconscious vs unconscious. The term “Nonconscious” is used to
refer to the contents of mind not reaching active or passive awareness,
while the term “unconscious” is better suited for medical syndromes that
include loss of wakefulness, interruption in awareness of oneself and one’s
surroundings, and unresponsiveness to external stimuli.
• Phantasy vs. fantasy. The (controversial) spelling is intended to
convey the fundamental difference between the two phenomena, one
nonconscious (phantasy) and the other conscious (fantasy), although they
may overlap. Klein (Isaacs, 1948) conceived phantasy as a phylogenetically
inherited, innate biological template to organize survival instincts and
unconditioned affects into primitive mental forms. These forms, so
the theory goes predate real experience and are sequestered from
reality-testing (Isaacs, 1948; Unconscious Phantasy, 2011; Auchincloss
and Samberg, 2012). Klein (Unconscious Phantasy, 2011) considered
phantasy to operate below the level of fantasy, or conscious wishful
distortions of reality (colloquially “wishful thinking”) that gratify impulses or
solve one’s inner problems while reality testing is intact but ignored. As
either defensive or gratifying operation, fantasy (wish-fulfillment) may or
may not contain elements
(Continued)
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Science of Phantasy: The Plausibility Argument Only
The concept of phantasy awaits scientific validation. It is however
plausible that the origination of human mind has a head-start via
some innate biological code that predictably transforms physical
sensations, biological instincts, and unconditioned affects into
rudimentary mental forms. Randomness at early stages of
mind development seems implausible from an evolutionary
perspective. In the absence of direct evidence, Ogden (1984)
reviews examples of psychological “deep structures” acting as
innate biological codes that organize perception and early
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self- and object-representations to one’s acquisition of culture
(Auchincloss and Samberg, 2012). As noted, object relations
arise from early survival- and safety-level experiences with
caretakers and thus evoke peak unconditioned affects (fear,
rage, pleasure, safety). The biological basis of such learning
likely involves memory, here affect-enhanced episodic memory,
the brain faculty by which self-related events are encoded as
memory traces or engrams10 and operate inside the mind as
a sustained presence. The incidence of experiences narrowly
related to survival and safety decreases with increasing cognitive
and physical autonomy. Emotion-enhanced episodic memories
continue after childhood, but become mostly concerned with
experiences that either promote or frustrate one’s current goals
(Talmi et al., 2019).

learning and might support the concept of phantasy by analogy.
One such code is Piaget’s pre-existing “innate systems” in
which children organize thinking into structured clusters of
concepts. However, this and other examples from linguistics
and anthropology (Ogden, 1984, p. 502–503) concern an
advanced brain organization relative to neonates, and might
reflect the intrinsic concept-making propensity of the brain’s
convergence regions7 (LeDoux, 2002; Wang et al., 2012) which
are immature but fast developing since the latter half of infancy
and toddlerhood (reviewed in Merve Çikili, 2018). In contrast,
phantasy in neonates might arise from information processing
in the limbic system (instincts, affects) and sensory-motor
association cortices (intero- and exteroceptive sensations), both
operational at birth. If so, such processing might generate a type
of a priori imagery of the outside world, perhaps reflecting archaic
mental forms associated with activated biological instincts and
unconditioned affects.

PARTIAL OBJECT RELATIONS
The Theory

Introjection: Taking the Outside World Into
the Mind

From birth to about 6 months of life, neonates and infants
suffer a great deal of anxiety about own survival and safety,
first caused by the trauma experienced during delivery, and
postnatally by occasional but inevitable hunger, pain, frustration
of instinctual needs, etc. Per Klein (1935, 1946) such distressful
experiences are phantasized to be threats of annihilation by
some outside invasive persecutor – conceptualized as phantasy
of “Not I” in Kleinian psychoanalysis. Phantasy is molded
by activated unconditioned affects and survival-instincts into
paranoid fears for own safety with defensive impulses to
destroy the threat (“paranoid-schizoid position”) (Klein, 1946).
The projected destructive impulses, at first directed at the
breast and later at the mother, are partly re-introjected and
become the internal persecuting “bad object” (Klein, 1946).
Positive experiences (safety, pleasure, comfort – or phantasy
of “I” in Kleinian psychoanalysis) are split-off from their
negative counterparts and thereby protected from destruction
from within (“partial object relations”). Klein (1946, p. 99)
uses the phrase “division of love and hate” to describe
the unrealistic but purposeful split between contradictory
experiences toward the same object. Self-representations derived
from the interactions are also dichotomized, gratified or
frustrated, for they share the affective valence with gratifying
or frustrating object-representations (Jacobson, 1964). Klein
(1935, 1946) thought of early splitting as a normal and
purely mental mechanism that is essential for continuous mind
organization around the focal point of positive experiences.
During normal development, splitting is “binary,” or consisting
of two contrasting wholes, in which case the predominant
“good” self- and object-representations serve as the foundation
for less frequent “bad” episodic experiences to be added and
neutralized as exceptions. Prolonged uncontrollable stress may
perpetuate pathological persistence of dichotomized self- and
object-representations, which, by means of multiple splitting,

The psychoanalytic term “introjection”8 metaphorizes the
process whereby the mind is modified by real or phantasized
aspects of the outside world that are “taken into the mind”
as mental representations of that world (Auchincloss and
Samberg, 2012, Box 1). In neonates, so the theory goes, upon
activation by instincts and affects, projected imagery of phantasy
is tested against actual experience evoked by the interaction
(Isaacs, 1948). The resulting blend is introjected as an objectrepresentation, at first dichotomized by evoked affects into
“horrifying” (fear for survival in the context of hunger, pain,
etc.) or “idealized” (affirmation of survival in the context of
comfort, safety, etc.). Such object-representation becomes an
“internal object” that continues its influence on the mind from
within (Box 1). Embedded in object-representations are selfrepresentations that are believed to arise from the neonate’s
non-conscious detection of own activated instincts, sensations,
and affects being linked with an outside presence9 . A selfrepresentation thus shares affective valence and develops in
tandem with object-representation of which it is initially a part
(Jacobson, 1964).

Neuroscience of Introjection
Object relation theorists pioneered the idea that introjection, a
mental portrait of the outside world, must have a neural substrate
in perception and memory (Riviere, 1952), both processes
of “primary autonomy” independent from instinctual drives
(Hartmann et al., 1964). Introjection allows the brain/mind to
record the history of real or perceived interactions between
the individual and the world of objects, and as such plays a
major role in mental life throughout the life-cycle, from early
7 Convergence

regions, e.g., prefrontal, parietal, and parahippocampal cortices,
among others, are highly connected brain regions where concepts are formed
from multimodal neural percepts, i.e., “where neural becomes mental” by cognitive
synthesis (LeDoux, 2002).
8 Introjection and internalization are overlapping concepts (Auchincloss and
Samberg, 2012); here, the term introjection is used consistently to avoid confusion.
9 The mechanism is sometimes called “introjective identification”.

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

10 Engrams

or “memory traces” refer to a small group of neurons co-wired in a
Hebbian fashion, showing lasting cellular changes as a consequence of activation
of that subpopulation of neurons by episodic stimuli; reactivation of engram cells
by a part of the original stimuli results in memory recall (Tonegawa et al., 2018).
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continuing hippocampal input12 , mature to become the active
memory of the episode (Kitamura et al., 2017). The mPFC
engram cells are believed to enable amalgamation of distributed
component engrams of multimodal information into a coherent
episode (Tonegawa et al., 2018), now “systems-consolidated.”
The hippocampal originals then become silent, in the sense
that they show a decreased density of dendritic spines and
can be reactivated only by optogeneitc stimulation, but not
by natural clues; whether the hippocampus eventually loses
the memory information is unknown (Tonegawa et al., 2018).
The amygdala also provides input during the formation of the
mPFC engrams but unlike the hippocampus, it remains active in
providing the affect-memory of the experience (Kitamura et al.,
2017). The process of contextual fear memory is described here
but a similar process is likely for reward-enhanced memories
both types qualifying as episodic-like memories (Phelps and
LeDoux, 2005; Kitamura et al., 2017). Extrapolated to human
infants, contradictory affects evoked by frustrating vs. rewarding
interactions with caretakers are likely encoded by separate groups
of amygdala neurons dedicated to only one of the valences.
As each group provides affect-information about its respective
experience, self- and object-representations derived from these
episodes are dichotomized by affects into either rewarding or
frustrating13 . The psychoanalytic concept of splitting between
affectively dichotomized self- and object-representations may
therefore be hardwired in the amygdala. Psychoanalysis and
neuroscience appear to describe the same phenomenon from
different angles, functional and neuroanatomical, respectively.

remain unsystematized and co-exist as split off fragments,
each a unipolar unit of experience (“bad” or “good”) about
one’s own self and others. Specifically, chronic severe stress
in neonates and young infants may disrupt the intrinsic
concept-making ability of mPFC, an effect reported in rodents
(Czeh et al., 2018) and may account for multiple splitting
of partial object relations in severe cases of personality
disorder (Kernberg, 1975). In less severe cases, splitting may
reach binarity (“good” vs. “bad” as contrasting wholes) but
experience remains polarized due to stress-induced disruption
of prefrontal cognitive integrations (reviewed in Teicher and
Samson, 2016).

Neuroscience of Partial Object Relations:
Affective Dichotomization of Sensory
Stimuli as the First Organizer of the Mind
Studies of contextual fear conditioning in rodents use
recombinant DNA (Gossen and Bujard, 1992) that enables
activity-dependent gene expression in neurons (Reijmers et al.,
2007)), in vivo imaging of calcium-dependent neuronal activity,
retrograde pathway tracing, gain of function manipulation,
and optogenetics (Redondo et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2016;
Kitamura et al., 2017). This methodology has demonstrated how
affect-enhanced episodic memories form. The semantic-like
content (i.e., “what” - an aversive or rewarding event, not in
itself an affect)11 , spatial context (“where”) are processed by
distributed neocortical regions and the hippocampus (Howard,
2017; Tonegawa et al., 2018). However, a full temporal context
(“when”) is not available in infancy. Subjective awareness
of time is a network phenomenon that appears to involve
left lateral parietal and left frontal cortices, cerebellum and
thalamus (Nyberg et al., 2010), although the hippocampus
might some ability to form temporal order (Eichenbaum,
2014). Subjective time is mentally constructed by adding
temporal dimension to episodic memories (past and future
thinking) (Nyberg et al., 2010) and is aided by the perceptual
vividity and the ease of extracting information from the
stimulus (Matthews and Meck, 2016). Temporal order of events
appears to be assembled in non-conscious working memory
(Trübutschek et al., 2019), before being re-represented in
conscious working memory, and thus can be attained in mid-tolate toddlerhood when such cognitive higher-order processing is
sufficiently developed.
The hippocampus forms an index of neural activities that
were present during the actual experience (Teyler and DiScenna,
1986). The contextual affect is engramized in the amygdala
(Kitamura et al., 2017) by neurons genetically programmed
to encode only rewarding or frustrating affects (Kim et al.,
2016). As they are being encoded via synaptic plasticity, the
hippocampal engrams engage mPFC to form its corresponding
indexing engram, at first silent but within several weeks of

INTEGRATED OBJECT RELATIONS:
COGNITIVE RECONCILIATION OF
AFFECTIVE DICHOTOMIES …AND
BEYOND
Two parallel developments mark the transition from partial
to integrated object relations, a gradual cognitive process
evolving from roughly 6 months to 2–3-years-of-life14 , when selfand object-constancy are established. The infant/child becomes
increasingly adept at:
(i) integrating dichotomized experience into a realistic
cognitive-affective frame whereby significant objects (and
the related sense of self) can be experienced as both
gratifying and frustrating) and
(ii) mentally differentiating self- from object-representations;
such mental boundary toward others allows the sense of self
12 Both the creation of silent cortical engrams and their maturation require an
intact hippocampus and include, among other mechanisms, immediate early
genes, epigenetic modifications, and a repeated sharp-wave ripple-mediated replay
of activity of hippocampal engrams (Tonegawa et al., 2018).
13 Co-existence of symbiosis (Mahler et al., 1975) and partial object relations
(Klein, 1946) during the first 6 months-of-life has been challenged as incompatible,
as object-representations are necessarily encoded as dyadic from birth, due to
hardwired affective dichotomization of experience in the amygdala (Kitamura
et al., 2017).
14 An approximation, based on Mahler’s (Mahler et al., 1975) separationindividuation timeline, likely varies in individual instances.

11 The

hippocampus appears to encode the contextual semantic-like affective
valence (factual knowledge that an event was aversive of rewarding) perhaps based
on the input from the amygdala affect-memory via stratum oriens (Muller et al.,
2018).
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self- and object- representations results in each having a
predominantly positive valence, which tends to remain stable
despite occasional frustrations. Such “self-constancy” (Mahler
et al., 1975) and “object-constancy” (Hartmann, 1952) evolve
in tandem from about 6 months to 2-3 years-of-age through
co-determined processes (Auchincloss and Samberg, 2012).
Attainment of self- and object-constancy is a developmental
milestone essential for further progression of mind development
and social relations.
Anatomically segregated groups of amygdala neurons are
genetically programmed to encode only one affective valence
of episodic memories (Kim et al., 2016). Thus, the dichotomies
inherent to partial object relations cannot be integrated in situ,
only by higher-order cognitive synthesis. Intrinsic processing
within mPFC is known to be involved in rule and categorization
memories, including the formation of schematic frameworks
for episodic memories (Wang et al., 2012). Klein (1935,
1946) observed the emergence of integrated object relations
around 6-months-of-life. If so, this introductory integration
of polarized experience could be piloted by the mentioned
intrinsic concept-making propensity of the mPFC. The process is
likely facilitated by emerging recognition memory and selective
attention (Reynolds and Romano, 2016). The outcome of such
processing may be an implicit, gist-like schematization of related
interactive episodes, i.e., that primary affects recognized as own16
may alternate between positive and negative across contradictory
experiences with the same object. Individual components of early
care tend to be positively correlated. A good-enough caretaker
generally delivers adequate but not perfectly good care and vice
versa. As the hippocampus provides the contextual, semanticlike valence of enhanced episodic memories (Eichenbaum, 2017;
Tonegawa et al., 2018), schematized related events likely coalesce
into a net-valence based on regularities in care (usual distress
vs. usual comfort), ultimately a net-experience of threat to or
assurance of survival. Implicit integration into good-and-bad
self- and object-representations therefore means a predominance
of one valence. The net-rewarding valence of early integrated
object relations may implicitly dampen negative affects aroused
by frustrating interactions with the same object.
Unconditioned survival-level experiences of neonates and
infants evolve to bilateral participation in danger/safety learning
in toddlers. The willful role of the caretaker as the source of
reward and frustration can be recognized by toddlers, likely
reflecting the ongoing development of selective attention and
working memory. These are two functionally inter-dependent
cognitive processes (Marchetti, 2014) are closely tied to the
biological maturation of the PFC, both are network phenomena,
and both are rudimentary but fast developing after roughly 6–8
months of age (Reynolds and Romano, 2016).
Whenever a self- and object-representation of negative
valence is activated, it can now be balanced in working memory
by its positive opposite during the “reparation” process with a

to be internally maintained, and increasingly independent
from caretaker’s affects and actions.
The phenomenology and mechanisms of whole object relations
are discussed in more detail below.

Neuroscience of Integration of
Dichotomized Experience: Schematization
of Episodic Memories
Episodic-to-Semantic Memory Conversion:
Generalization of Knowledge From Specific
Experiences
Mental functioning would be inefficient, if not impossible, if
episodic memories retained the level of external contextual detail
present at encoding. In “Funes the Memorious” by Borges (1998),
a fictional character Ireneo Funes remembers absolutely every
single detail of all episodic experiences. Thus, Funes has no need
for generalizations, the essence of thinking, and his remarkable
capability becomes a cognitive limitation.
All episodic memory is first encoded by synaptic plasticity
in the hippocampus-amygdala memory system. As noted, the
hippocampus forms an index of neocortical activities that encode
individual components of multimodal sensory experience (Teyler
and DiScenna, 1986). The amygdala encodes the affect-memory
of the experience (Kitamura et al., 2017). The mechanism
of systems-consolidation of episodic memory is contentious.
Multiple trace theory posits that the hippocampus records
multiple traces of related episodes, and as the number of
traces increases so too does the likelihood that the episode is
accessible to remote recall (reviewed in Kandel et al., 2014).
Alternatively, recent findings show how the mPFC, engaged
by inputs from the hippocampus and amygdala, consolidates
long-term episodic memories while the hippocampal engrams
become silent (reviewed in Tonegawa et al., 2018). Whether
remote episodic memories continue to depend on hippocampus
for context retrieval is also a point of contention. These questions,
important for memory research, are not central to this discussion.
What seems to be certain is that multiple related episodes
are extracted into a gist-like neocortical schema based on
overlaps, statistical regularities, and abstractions, aka “schemalearning” or “episodic-to-semantic conversion” (Kandel et al.,
2014; Tonegawa et al., 2018). Gist-like neocortical schemas are
independent of specific learning episodes, as their main function
is to extract abstract knowledge from specific past experiences
(Wiltgen and Silva, 2007) that can be generalized across similarbut-novel situations that may arise in the future (details in
Box 3).

Intrinsic Propensity for Schema Learning and
Rudimentary Working Memory Are Plausible
Mechanisms of Integrated Object Relations
In the context of good-enough parenting15 and/or heritably
tempered affect reactivity, integration of affectively dichotomized
15 Winnicott (1971) coined the phrase “good-enough” to emphasize the importance

neglectful or abusive caregivers and dysfunctional families, sufficiently stressogenic
to cause structural and functional brain/mind pathology, as in personality disorder.
16 In infants, rudimentary sense of ownership of instincts and affects might be
available, perhaps mediated by their respective interoceptive correlates and affectmemory traces (Panksepp, 2011; Damasio and Carvalho, 2013).

of natural instincts of normal devoted parents and stable, healthy families, in an
attempt to counterbalance the potential idealization of parenting implicit in Klein’s
concepts of “good mother”. Occasional manageable frustrations are necessary for
the child to develop self-reliance (Kohut, 1971). The phrase “bad enough” refers to
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org
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good-enough parent (to be discussed). The mPFC is essential
to providing such emotional information to working memory
(Smith et al., 2018). Occasional negative experiences with the
same significant object can still be assimilated but neutralized
as exceptions. An interesting possibility is that such cognitiveaffective balancing may occur within non-conscious working
memory where neural engrams are “higher-order represented”
by cognitive processing, but are still non-conscious (LeDoux
and Brown, 2017). Non-conscious working memory can be
conceived as a hidden layer of the mind because its neural
input is amenable to modifications by covert yet teleological
cognitive influences (Bergstrom and Eriksson, 2018) before
its output is re-represented in conscious working memory
(LeDoux and Brown, 2017). Specifically, cognitive integration
of dichotomies may involve attention-mediated modifications of
synaptic-weights and/or oscillatory phase-locking that modify
functional connectiviy. Both may influence the neural input
to working memory representing affectively opposite valences
across interactive episodes. The process of integration is likely
non-conscious, as is the case with most other cognitive
processing (Kihlstrom, 1987). However, the outcome (output),
i.e., the experience of self- and object-constancy, may reach
phenomenal consciousness in toddlers, as first-person experience
“for there to be something that it is like for one” (LeDoux and
Brown, 2017), here the predominantly positive relationship with
the caretaker.
Neither the survival-level experiences of infancy nor the
safety-danger experiences of toddlerhood remain as memories
of specific events. The brain structures and large-scale networks
involved in long term memory, e.g., the hippocampus and PFC,
among others (Wheeler et al., 2013) are not sufficiently mature
in infants and toddlers. Moreover, the subsystem of self, which
fortifies episodic memory by self-referenced cognition, has yet
to fully self-organize in toddlers. Self-reference provides a form
of associative glue for perception, memory, and decision-making
and, through this, acts as a “central mechanism in information
processing” (Sui and Humphreys, 2015, p. 719).

The Sense of Self: From Non-conscious Neural
Engrams to Self-Awareness
As LeDoux and Brown (2017) summarize, adult self-schema
includes (i) autobiographical episodic memories, (ii) semantic
memory of one’s identity (“who am I”), (iii) semanticized
episodic memories across related interactive episodes converted
into semantic knowledge of one’s own personality traits (Klein,
2013), i.e., how one usually feels, acts, and thinks in particular
situations (LeDoux and Brown, 2017), and (iv) one’s bodyschema, i.e., static and kinetic state of the body as well as its
functional integrity (Mendoza, 2011; Morasso et al., 2015). These
components of a self-schema exist as non-conscious engrams and
body-sensing neural systems and are thus non-mental, first-order
neural states, until represented by maturing cognitive networks
in working memory, when neural encodings become higherorder mental states (LeDoux and Brown, 2017). Such higher
order cognitive representation in working memory unifies the
subjective background information about the physical self with
mental experience of the active working self into an “embodied
self ” (Kernberg, 2014). The debate whether neural memory
engrams and subcortical affect circuits per se can generate
subjective conscious experiences that does not involve cognitive
representation is ongoing (“first-order” vs “higher-order theory
of emotional consciousness”). We have adopted the HOTEC (as
seen in Box 2) but acknowledge alternative views.
Borrowing descriptors from LeDoux and Brown (2017),
the engramized self-schema becomes a conscious sense of self
through a series of higher order representations (HOR) and
re-representations (HOR of HOR, or HOROR) by the general
network of cognition in working memory (Box 4). Each new
representation is a higher-order cognitive reflection of the lowerorder representation, figuratively a “recognizer of recognizers”
(Edelman and Mountcastle, 1982). The first HOR of the semantic
self-schema (self-HOR) within non-conscious working memory
remains non-conscious while still allowing for an autonoetic
conscious state of the self to result from the re-representation,
self-HOROR, in conscious working memory (LeDoux and
Brown, 2017, p. E2019–2020). The re-representation gives rise
to a phenomenally conscious experience of self with minimal
inner awareness. The self is only passively noticed as the first
person subjective experience of “knowing what is it like” for
me. . . (the taste of an apple). . . and phenomenal quality of
experience (e.g., the taste of apples vs. the smell of a rose)
(LeDoux and Brown, 2017). The background presence of first
person phenomenal experience establishes a mental boundary
with objects as they are represented in the mind, figuratively
a mental “I” coexisting with others. Reflecting this milestone,
3–4 year old children-peers are able to “keep the secret” for
each other (which involves understanding boundaries between
information that one possesses and information that parents
possess (Gordon et al., 2014) or tell a lie (reflecting their
emerging understanding of the subjective nature of beliefs)
(Evans and Lee, 2013). Both phenomena are suggestive of the
child’s awareness of the impenetrability of his or her mind. First
mental clashes with the world also emerge around this age, aka
“the terrible twos,” coinciding with the emergence of “autonomy
and will” in Erikson’s (1959) terms. An actively introspective,

Mental Separation of Self- From
Object-Representations
In parallel with the integration of contradictory self- and objectrepresentations, the experience of self, initially embedded in
object-representations, achieves phenomenological autonomy to
emerge as independent experience. Such mental differentiation
of self-representations from internalized object-representations
is a milestone first recognized around 18–24 months-of-age,
an approximation based on Mahler et al. (1975). The PFC
develops most rapidly during the first 24 months of life (review
in Hodel, 2018) thereby providing neuro-cognitive mechanisms
for such differentiation to emerge. The recently formulated
HOTEC (LeDoux and Brown, 2017; Brown et al., 2019) has been
challenged (Naccache, 2018).The HOTEC, however, provides
a cogent account of the development of the sense of self by
cognitive processing of semanticized episodic events, at the
core of which is the implicit self-schema extracted from early
object relations.
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attack, as in partial object relations (Etherington, 2020). Fear of
losing the object and guilt about one’s aggressive impulses that
damage internal self- and object-representations are the most
important of these new experiences. In times of frustration, fear
and guilt activate the drive for reparation in the child (Klein,
1933). Compassionate reassurance by a good-enough mother
restores and strengthens the child’s positive inner representations
of both. During the working-through period, mediated by goodenough parenting, guilt-driven anxieties about the safety of
the object mature into a genuine concern for the welfare of
the object, joy in giving and mutual exchanges, empathy and
reciprocity, while the destructive envy of the object’s powers
evolves into gratitude for care and support (Klein, 1957). At
this point, around 3 years of age, a stable good internal object,
corresponding to self-regulating object-constancy, a successful
outcome of the separation-individuation process (Mahler et al.,
1975), and an autonomous self, mainly internally defined and
maintained (Hartmann, 1950; Kernberg, 1975), are established.
Both attainments set the stage for stabilization of affects
across contradictory interactions (affect-constancy). Successfully
working through sadness, guilt, envy, jealousy, Oedipal issues,
and anxieties of depressive position, facilitated by support from
significant objects, is a prerequisite for the capacity for mature
love (guilt and sadness are an inherent part of love and deepen it
profoundly) (Klein and Riviere, 1937) and healthy interpersonal
and social mental life. Notwithstanding, working through the
anxieties of depressive position continues over lifetime during
personal crises, stress, or challenges in significant relationships
(Klein, 1935, 1946). Unresolved childhood anxieties of depressive
position may increase one’s vulnerability to maladaptive core
beliefs, depression and anxiety in particular, despite integrated
dichotomies of partial object relations (Box 6). The concept of
depressive position is considered by many to be the finest of
Klein’s contributions to understanding the human mind.

BOX 2 | Self and conscious emotions: from neural engrams to enhanced
episodic memories of which one is a self-aware feeling part.
As LeDoux and Brown (2017) summarize, adult self-schema includes (i)
memories of self-related episodic events, (ii) semantic memory of one’s
identity2 , (iii) semantic memory about one’s own personality traits, i.e., how
one usually feels, acts, and thinks in particular situations (Klein, 2013), and (iv)
one’s body-schema, i.e., static and kinetic state of the body as a whole and its
individual parts, such as location and orientation of various parts and relative
motion in space and time, as well as functional integrity (Mendoza, 2011).
Complex inter-connectedness between self and autobiographical knowledge
is the self-memory system (Conway, 2005): different types of memory provide
data that constrain the working self, defined as a set of active personal goals
and self-images in particular social-communicative interactions (Guerini et al.,
2019), but in turn memory is also reciprocally controlled for accessibility by
the working self (Conway, 2005). Again borrowing from LeDoux and Brown
(2017), conscious emotions of which one is a self-aware part (i.e., autonoetic
consciousness of self and emotions) are tied to representation of the self
as part of a higher-order state that constitutes the felt experience [“no selfno emotion” (LeDoux and Brown, 2017, p. E2023)]. Conscious emotions
are born by the same sequence of cognitive HOR, HOROR, and HOR of
HOROR although with a different neural input from: (i) engramized emotion
schemas (memorized facts about a particular affect-provoking situation, but
not itself an emotion), (ii) activated subcortical survival circuits and affects
(evoked affects are cognitively represented as conscious emotion in working
memory), (iii) the relevant self-schema (i.e., how one usually feels, thinks, and
acts in that particular situation), and iv) autobiographical memories of similar
events (LeDoux and Brown, 2017).
2 The subsystem of identity (“who am I inside”) aligns past and present
self-images and personal goals into a coherent narrative of the self
and thus enables prospection. This usually requires some falsification of
autobiographical memories, suggesting that identity may be a function of the
working self, which controls accessibility to memory to an extent, rather than
an independent subsystem within the mind.

self-aware self emerges through yet another re-representation
of the phenomenally experienced self, a HOR of self-HOROR
(LeDoux and Brown, 2017). Capacity for introspection has been
demonstrated in 3–4 year-old-children and is thought to be a key
prerequisite for the theory of mind of others (Gonzales et al.,
2018). The mechanism of higher order (re)representations in
working memory is unknown. Some possibilities are reviewed in
Box 4.

Neuroscience of Successful “Working Through”
Interactive self-organization of the PFC, a key hub in the brain’s
general network of cognition are a plausible neural substrate
for the successful “working through” the anxieties of depressive
position, culminating in an internally defined and maintained
sense of self and cognitive-emotional constancy of significant
objects. The general network of cognition (LeDoux and Brown,
2017) encompasses a number of partially overlapping functional
connectivity networks (and their composite subnetworks) that
spread across medial and lateral parietal and frontal regions,
and dynamically interact to produce various facets of cognition
(Bressler and Menon, 2010). These include, among others, central
executive network engaged in working memory and top-down
attentional control (Miller et al., 2018), salience network that
is thought to mediate attention to monitor the salience of
external inputs and internal brain events as well as to recruit
relevant functional networks (Goulden et al., 2014), default mode
network that is thought to comprise an integrated system for
autobiographical, self-monitoring, and social cognitive function
(Bressler and Menon, 2010). The maturing general network
of cognition has been implicated in the emerging capacity for
working memory and executive top-down control of subcortical

Beyond the Integration of Dichotomies:
Working Through the Anxieties of
Depressive Position
Cognitive integration of dichotomized object-representations
has been termed “depressive position” by Klein (1935, 1946),
because the dyadic object comes to be experienced by the
infant as whole object, who can be frustrating but is generally
rewarding and is thus idealized; this, in turn, generates depressive
fears that the object could be lost. Achievement of depressive
position creates a number of new experiences that need to
be “worked through” (psychoanalytic phrase for “resolved”), a
gradual process from about 6-months to about 3-years-of-life.
Paranoid fears about one’s own safety are now accompanied
by anxieties about the safety of the object, whose absence, for
example, is now experienced as loss rather than a persecutory
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24-month old infants/toddlers) (Klein, 1935, 1946; Benoit, 2004),
both correlate with the quality of parenting and/or heritable affect
reactivity (Kernberg, 1975; Benoit, 2004), and both are implicit
and preconceptual; the above is suggestive of linear relatedness
between early object relations and attachment patterns. The
master schema of whole object relations determines implicit
anticipation of a reassuring caregiver’s response to the child’s
negative emotions (secure attachment). The master schema of
partial object relations determines implicit anticipation of either
outright rejection, unpredictable/varied, or atypical/distorted
caregiver responses to the child’s distress (van Ijzendoorn et al.,
1999; Benoit, 2004). The insecurely attached infant/child builds
implicit action programs to deal with negative emotions in the
presence of bad-enough caretakers, observable as pathology of
attachment. The latter is classified as insecure-avoidance toward
rejecting parents, insecure-resistance with display of amplified
distress toward unpredictable parents, and disorganized, bizarre
or contradictory behaviors in the context of distorted or atypical
parenting (van Ijzendoorn et al., 1999; Benoit, 2004). Attachment
pathology is predictive of poor social and emotional outcomes
(Benoit, 2004), including personality disorder (Levy et al.,
2005), the latter especially severe with antecedent disorganized
attachment (Beeney et al., 2017).

affect reactivity (Miller et al., 2018), internally motivated selective
attention (Corbetta et al., 2008), the overlapping capacities for
the theory of mind (Corbetta et al., 2008), cognitive empathy,
helping behaviors, moral reasoning (Preston and de Waal, 2002),
mentalizing (Luyten and Fonagy, 2015), self-referenced cognition
(Sui and Humphreys, 2015), and conscious emotion (LeDoux
and Brown, 2017), among others. These advanced mental
capacities co-emerge during the integration of dichotomized
object relations and mediate working through guilt and other
anxieties of depressive position created by this integration.

The Self: A Composite of Coexisting
More-and-Less Integrated Object
Relations
Around 3 years-of-age, social life begins to expand to include
other significant objects, the father and selective family, later
on selective friends and peers, romantic partners, work, among
others. These significant relationships are first processed for
safety and acceptance through the master prism of early
object relations, but also tend to add specific cognitive-affective
generalizations to the sense of self and the world of objects.
Under normal circumstances, integrated object relations expand
to include other significant relationships in the context of stable
self-esteem and healthy trust. In personality disorder, partial
object relations expand to include experiences of rejection in
the context of one’s own fragility, endangerment, and general
distrust of others. Reflecting the influence of multiple objects
of variable significance in different personal domains and at
different levels of mental integration of both parties, practically
everyone’s mind harbors a mosaic of more and less integrated
mental representations of themselves and others (Auchincloss
and Samberg, 2012). As Fairbairn (1954) observed in practice,
multiple coexisting units of the unified experience of self arise
from an element of self-engaged in affect-energized relationship
with an element of a significant object. In other words, even
within the same significant relationship, there can be more or less
mature self- and object representations. It is the pervasiveness of
what is polarized or balanced that define normalcy vs. pathology
of object relations in any given individual (Svrakic and DivacJovanovic, 2019). If there was a single network that would
represent the neural substrate of the sense of self, the DMN and
the dorsal mPFC as one its key hubs are the prime candidates
(Box 5).

Adaptive Value of Whole Object Relations:
Balancing the Mind and Behavior
Affective dichotomization of sensory stimuli is hardwired in
the normal anatomy and function of the amygdala (Kim et al.,
2016). Such hardwired polarization is evolutionarily important
as it enables rapid either-or responses when subcortical affects
and survival instincts guide behavior (e.g., freeze-fight-or-flight).
The development of PFC, one of the key hubs in attentionreorienting (Corbetta et al., 2008) and working memory networks
(Wang et al., 2006), has enabled humans to carry out internally
chosen goal-directed behavior and avoid affective distractions
by maintaining attention, planning, and volition, aka “executive
function.” The latter is one of the two main functions of working
memory, the other is to maintain information “online” for
comparisons, recognitions, and contrasts (Miller et al., 2018). In
the vast majority of human personal and interpersonal emotional
situations, balanced and reflective rather than extremized and
reflexive mind and behavior are adaptively advantageous, while
amygdala-driven reactions remain important for emergencies.

EARLY BEHAVIORAL MANIFESTATIONS
OF OBJECT RELATIONS
NEUROSCIENCE OF KEY
PSYCHOANALYTIC POSTULATES ABOUT
OBJECT RELATIONS

The master schema of early object relations underlies implicit
predictions of outcomes and automatized action programs in
significant relationships, as discussed. The earliest example of
this implicit guidance may be observed as attachment patterns
(Benoit, 2004). Attachment refers to preconceptual internal
models of behaviors related to safety and protection within a
specific and circumscribed aspect of the relationship between
a child and caregiver (Benoit, 2004). Object relations and
attachment patterns are coincidental (both are observed in 6 to
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(Auchincloss and Samberg, 2012, p.175)17 . Cognitive-, cellular, and systems-neuroscience of schematized episodic experience
in humans (van Kesteren et al., 2016; van Kesteren and
Meeter, 2020) and rodents (Tse et al., 2011; Wang et al.,
2012) provide a potential mechanism for this theorizing.
Schematic frameworks for survival- and safety-level experiences
of infancy and toddlerhood appear to be formed and stored
in the mPFC while the amygdala continues to provide input
about contextual affect-memories (Kitamura et al., 2017), as
discussed. Together these implicit cortical-subcortical encodings
constitute the primordial schema-affect template of the mind.
Self-reinforcing patterns of schema expansion and updates are
similar for rodents and humans (Box 3). The implicit schemaaffect template itself may not be accessible to representation by
cognitive networks of which it is the integral part and may remain
something of an epistemic quandary (Solms, 2015). Nonetheless,
it profoundly influences the subsequent self-organization of
functional connectivity networks that dynamically interact to
deliver mental faculties of cognition, motivation, and emotion
(Zorumski and Rubin, 2011). The mental faculties can be thought
of as the “tools of the mind” that, each from a different angle
but acting in concert, enable the mind to communicate with
itself, the inner and the outer world, and to change and/or adapt
to both. The second avenue of mind development involves a
sequential differentiation of its subsystems, e.g., temperament
traits, the experience of self, identity, character traits, and moral
values (Svrakic and Divac-Jovanovic, 2019). The subsystems can
be thought of as semi-stable functional coalitions of relevant
cognition, motivation, and emotion that emerge in a predictable
order, temperament fist – character and moral values last, to
meet increasingly complex adaptive demands; each subsystem
contributes a unique adaptive function to the overall adaptive
fitness of the mind (Svrakic and Divac-Jovanovic, 2019). The
inaugural template of early object relations harbors the rudiments
of mental faculties, i.e., the semantic-like content – rewarding
or aversive event, the associated affect of fear or pleasure,
and the motivation to self-protect or engage, all implicit, i.e.,
non-conscious, and non-declarative18 . As one of the main
convergence zones in the brain, the mPFC is a key hub in multiple
functional connectivity networks that underlie mental faculties.
The schema-affect template of early object relations is therefore
likely to influence interactive self-organization of these networks
from within, acting as a non-conscious operating system that
determines the relevance of future experience upon which these
networks are built. Such personalized self-organization of the
brain/mind adds a person-specific component to the relatively
stable general structure of functional brain networks (Gratton
et al., 2018), ultimately responsible for the mental uniqueness
of the individual or “personality.” Each mental faculty and each
subsystem of the mind are thus more or less distantly related
to early object relations. For example, rudiments of empathy,

BOX 3 | Schema-learning: extraction of general concepts from naturally
and/or affectively related specific experiences.
Schematized experience (schemas), defined as associated knowledge
structures that overarch related episodic memories, may involve de novo
processing by the mPFC which is suggestive of a new schema-engram,
aka “episodic-to-semantic-conversion” (Tonegawa et al., 2018). Of note,
neither mPFC engram cells nor circuitry for a semantic memory encoding
a schema for related episodic memories have been found (Tonegawa et al.,
2018). Alternatively, schema-learning may arise from the natural tendency
of episodic memories to semanticize over time, i.e., to lose spatio-temporal
context-specificity (“when” and “where”) while semantic information (“what
happened”) and contextual affects (“how it felt”) remain. Here, “episodic-tosemantic-conversion” naturally takes place within mPFC (Tonegawa et al.,
2018), perhaps reflecting the process of systems-consolidation of memory
(Wiltgen and Silva, 2007; Dudai, 2012). Neurophysiological and epigenetic
processes involving mPFC and hippocampus in schema-learning and selfreinforcing expansion have been described in animals (Tse et al., 2011;
Wang et al., 2012). A similar pattern in humans, involving crosstalk1 between
the hippocampus and ventromedial PFC (vmPFC) has been established for
schema-forming, self-reinforcing schema-expansion, and schema-alteration
(van Kesteren et al., 2010, 2012, 2016; van Kesteren and Meeter, 2020).
The hippocampus forms an index of attending neocortical activities involved
in encoding individual components of contextually reach memory and
connects with amygdala-encoded contextual affects evoked by the episode
(Tonegawa et al., 2018). A corresponding index is generated by the mPFC
during system-consolidation of episodic memories, a process guided by
hippocampus (Tonegawa et al., 2018), while the amygdala continues to
provide input about affects associated with the-memories (Kitamura et al.,
2017). Reinstatement (reactivation) of a previously learned episodic memory
during new hippocampal-amygdala encoding may facilitate across-event
generalizations and construction of schemas (van Kesteren et al., 2016).
Semantic (natural) or affective congruence with an existing schema, perhaps
determined by mPFC-amygdala crosstalk, my trigger such reactivations
which are thought to be executed by the hippocampus (Preston and
Eichenbaum, 2013). The mPFC may detect an activated schema and update
it (van Kesteren et al., 2012; Preston and Eichenbaum, 2013) by integrating
new or overlapping information into the schema. These updates are achieved
by re-consolidation during sleep and rest [reviewed in van Kesteren et al.
(2010) and van Kesteren et al. (2012)] and may result in re-construction
(expansion or alteration) of the existing schema. Once developed, a schema
might not be expanded only within mPFC, but the hippocampus might
provide “semantic-like” generalization rather than “episodic-like” learning to
add to the existing cortical semantic schema (Tse et al., 2011).
1 The crosstalk appears to be mediated by mPFC neurons being phase locked
to the hippocampal theta-rhythm (4–10 Hz) that characterizes hippocampal
activity during active exploratory behavior and REM sleep (van Kesteren et al.,
2016).

fairness, and reciprocity as forerunners of character traits and
moral values are detected in securely attached infants and
toddlers (Wynn and Bloom, 2013) presumed to have achieved
self- and object-constancy. These forerunners are later amended
by explicit socio-ethical norms to facilitate social adaptation.

Object Relations Are Dynamic and
Reversible

17 The postulate applies to normal development, but not to all psychopathology, as

Klein (1935, 1946) describes paranoid-schizoid and depressive
positions to differentiate developmental stages that the child
progresses through, from positions, or “ways of being,” that
humans oscillate between throughout development and into

discussed with CBT.
18 As such, survival- and safety-level object relations can be conceived as
elementary units of the mind, not divisible to lower-order mental experience only
to its distributed neural components (Svrakic and Divac-Jovanovic, 2019).
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adult life (Etherington, 2020). Klein (1935, 1946) observed
reversible shifts from paranoid-schizoid position to depressive
position and vice versa occurring over lifetime in response to
stress, loss, or personal crises and the resolutions of anxiety
and mourning thereof. Such resolutions are most effective
when achieved with support from significant others. The
concept of positions implies that object relations are semistable19 , i.e., dynamically reversible in response to changing
internal or external conditions. Well-integrated individuals
may experience splitting either as a consequence of transient
prefrontal dysfunction under acute stress or as a functional
defense mechanism in the context of chronic stress but
normal prefrontal function. With respect to the former, acute
severe stress may lead to increased catecholamine release in
the PFC and thereby transiently impact prefrontal networks
and working memory, while at the same time strengthening
affective responses of the amygdala (Arnsten, 2015). Such neural
“reflective-to-reflexive” switch may result in a transient state
of regressive polarization of experience (“transient splitting”),
but not necessarily permanently alter the neural organization
of the PFC, as may happen with chronic severe and early
stress (Czeh and Fuchs, 2016). In animal models, acute stress
induces neural effects that may spontaneously correct given
enough time for recovery (Czeh and Fuchs, 2016). With the
resolution of acute stress, one would expect a relatively rapid
restoration of prefrontal balancing of the mind. Under chronic
severe stress, splitting may be created by covert yet teleological
cognitive modulation of the weighted sensory-affective input
into nonconscious working memory even in the context of
intact PFC. Such splitting is a bona fide defense mechanism that
polarizes reality into less complex and thus easier to manage
dyads. In contrast, personality disorder is characterized by a
relatively stable hypofrontality and splitting (Kernberg, 1975).
However, phenotypic criteria for personality disorder tend to
ebb and flow across the diagnostic threshold over time, although
full health and social integration remain elusive (McGlashan
et al., 2005; Temes and Zanarini, 2018). Such spontaneous
symptomatic improvements and recurrences reflect alternations
between compensated and decompensated functioning (rather
than shifts between partial and integrated object relations), as
discussed later. A dynamic, time- and context-sensitive nosology
of personality disorder has been recently advocated (Svrakic and
Divac-Jovanovic, 2019).

BOX 4 | Large scale functional brain networks dynamically interact to
deliver various facets of cognition.
The general network of cognition (LeDoux and Brown, 2017) encompasses a
number of partially overlapping large-scale functional connectivity networks
(and their composite subnetworks) that spread across parietal and medial
and lateral frontal regions and dynamically interact to produce cognition,
e.g., central executive network engaged in higher-order cognitive and
attentional control, salience network that is thought to mediate attention
to monitor the salience of external inputs and internal brain events, default
mode network that is thought to comprise an integrated system for
autobiographical, self-monitoring, and social cognitive function, among
other networks (Bressler and Menon, 2010). The mechanism of higher
order (re)representations in working memory is unknown but could involve
rapid transitions in activity silent neural states, such as short-term synaptic
weight changes induced by periodic spiking-bursts within cognitive
networks perhaps involving calcium dynamics. (Miller et al., 2018). As a
complementary mechanism, frequency-specific oscillatory coherence could
mediate temporary shifts in functional connectivity by phase aligning periods
of excitability to maximize the opportunity for information transfer (and phase
misaligning to suppress communication) (Stokes, 2015). Such hidden state
transitions appear to flexibly configure memory networks for memory-guided
behavior and dissolve them equally fast to allow forgetting (Wolff et al., 2017).

into and retrieval in the face of a variety of contextual clues
(Talmi et al., 2019). Semantic memory proper (i.e., knowledge
of facts independent of context in which it was acquired)
expands in a web-like pattern whereby neural representations of
newly learned features are added to existing ones as successive
stages of feature learning (Bauer and Just, 2015) and typically
have no emotional biases for the information being learned.
Semanticized self-related enhanced episodic memories expand
in a similar web-like fashion, forming self-related associative
knowledge structures or schemas, but preferentially assimilate
information that is accordant with existing schema (Tse et al.,
2011) while discounting contradictory experience (Disner et al.,
2011). This implies an important role for affective input in
schema-forming and updates, for both rewarding and aversive
experiences (Phelps and LeDoux, 2005; Tonegawa et al., 2018).
Based on Talmi et al. (2019), all naturally related and all
affectively similar or similarly intense episodic memories tend
to cross-promote each other by semantic (top-down) or by
affective (bottom-up) stimuli, which may be objective or based
on subjective inference (Sanders et al., 2020). The en masse
activation may involve either real-time stimuli or may occur
internally, by default mode processing which enables a person
to time-travel through memories and their associated affects.
This en masse effect on the web of schematized self- and
object-representations and their associated affects by a single
activating clue might be the mechanism of what Klein (1935,
1946) observed as a pervasive activation of a good or bad
“internal object,” which of course also co-activates a pervasively
good or bad experience of one’s own self. It is plausible
that Klein used the singular to illustrate the cross-activated
plurality of destructive-aggressive vs. constructive-libidinal selfand object-representations, motivations, expectations, and action
patterns internalized over time. Hartmann (1950) and Jacobson
(1964) viewed libido and aggression as primary but not innate

Psychoanalytic Dual-Drive Theory Through
the Prism of Cognitive Neuroscience and
Unconditioned Affects
Reflecting the intrinsic organization of the encoding process,
emotion-enhanced episodic memories show increased binding
with their encoding context as well as inherent associations to
other emotionally arousing and semantically (naturally) related
memories (Talmi et al., 2019). Affect-enhanced memories attract
attention obligatorily and are prioritized both for encoding
19 A

semi-stable equilibrium of a complex system is one with multiple, but not
unlimited solutions to semi-stable “attractors” (here changing internal and/or
external conditions), which gives the system some, but not unlimited adaptive
flexibility.
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motivation systems. Rather, they argued that the two drives
develop from heritable dispositions via interactions with others,
pleasurable experiences consolidate into libido, unpleasurable
into aggression. Following Kernberg’s (2014) stratified concept
of motivation systems the mutual cross-promotion of naturally
related and affectively similar or similarly intense memories may
be the mechanism by which unconditioned affects, considered by
Panksepp (2011) to be the primary motivation system, coalesce
as constituent components of supraordinate motivation systems
of libido and aggression, the latter encompassing all constructive
vs. destructive tendencies of a person.

BOX 5 | The default mode network (DMN) could be the neural substrate
of the self.
The DMN is a functional connectivity network comprised of temporally
integrated activity in distributed brain regions (nodes) involved in numerous
cognitive functions, such as mPFC (social cognitive processes related to self
and others, sense of agency Renes et al., 2014), posterior cingulate cortex /
precuneus (autobiographical memory, self-referential processes) (Fransson
and Marrelec, 2008), medial temporal lobe (episodic memory), angular gyrus
(semantic memory), among others (Bressler and Menon, 2010). The DMN
exhibits strong low-frequency oscillations coherent during resting state and
is deactivated, although not completely, during attention-demanding goal
directed tasks (Sormaz et al., 2018). The brain defaults to DMN during
wakeful rest, disengaged from the external world but engaged in social
working memory (e.g., theory of mind of others, empathy, moral reasoning,
and social evaluations), reflecting upon one’s own autobiographical history,
traits, and emotions, and projecting oneself into the future (“internal
mentation”) …a form of “travel by mental simulation through our past, future,
and the minds of others”… (Andrews-Hanna, 2012, p. 13). If there was a
single network that would represent the neural substrate of the sense of self,
the DMN in general, the dorsal mPFC as one its key hubs in particular, are
the prime candidates (Gusnard et al., 2001). The incomplete deactivation
of the DMN during attention-demanding goal-directed tasks (Sormaz et al.,
2018) might be the mechanism of self-referential cognition and emotion
mediating the continuous representation of self in ongoing mental activities.

COGNITIVE SCHEMA THEORY AND
OBJECT RELATIONS THEORY: IS THERE A
NEED FOR BOTH?
Object relations theory and cognitive schema theory are
complementary in some and unique in other instances. Both
theories concern schematized episodic experiences and selfreinforcing expansion patterns during infancy and toddlerhood
(object relations) and childhood and adulthood (core-beliefs),
both coalescing into cognitive-affective schemas for processing
new information. As one of the main differences with object
relations theory, Beck’s cognitive theory considers core-beliefs,
relatively advanced valuative concepts about self and others, to
be the primordial source of self-reinforcing biases in interpreting
new experiences (Beck, 2011; Disner et al., 2011). In contrast,
object relations theory considers preconceptual survival- and
safety- level experiences of infants and toddlers to be the
primordial schema that regulates anticipation of safety vs.
endangerment in subsequent experience. It appears that Beck’s
concept of core beliefs, frequently associated with explicit
causative memories, falls short of recognizing preconceptual
experiences in infants and toddlers that have been schematized
but forgotten as specific memories. While complementing object
relations theory in normal development, cognitive theory does
not account for preconceptual, phase-sensitive aberrances in
brain/mind development, such as partial object relations in
personality disorder. On the other hand, object relations theory
fails to recognize that maladaptive core-beliefs and schemas may
develop despite integrated object relations, as in syndromes of
depression, generalized anxiety, and panic disorder.

of systems-consolidation of episodic memories has established
that neocortical schematic frameworks extracted from persistent
episodic events continue to receive input from the amygdala that
provides contextual affects evoked by these events (Kitamura
et al., 2017). The term “cognitive schema” in Beck’s theory is thus
somewhat misleading, as all schematized episodic experience is
associated with respective affect information. Cognitive theorists
talk about “depressive20 schemas. . . created by adversity21 . . .
characterized by negative self-referential beliefs” (Disner et al.,
2011, p. 467), implying that affective valence is an integral
constituent of core beliefs and cognitive schemas, much like in
object relations. Schema forming and self-reinforcing expansion
patterns have been demonstrated for rewarding and aversive
episodic experiences, as discussed.
In contrast to preconceptual object relations, core beliefs
emerge at more advanced stages of cognitive development,
require self-referential cognition, and ability to form complex
causal concepts. Based on modern neuroscience of schemaforming and schema-expansion in animals and humans (van
Kesteren et al., 2010, 2012, 2016; Tse et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2012;
van Kesteren and Meeter, 2020), under normal circumstances,
schematized self- and object-constancy (the earliest self-related
concepts extracted from integrated object relations) regulate
own expansion into cognitively advanced positive self-valuations
reflecting themes of self-sufficiency, lovability, and self-worth
(adaptive core beliefs), and finally generalize into higher-order
adaptive schemas that preferentially assimilate positive while
discounting negative information. Each phase in such cognitive
development likely involves processing in mPFC (Tse et al.,

Normal Development: Continuum From
Self- and Object-Constancy to Adaptive
(Functional) Core Beliefs and Schemas
Core-beliefs, for many the most innovative of Beck’s concepts,
are extracted from formative experiences during childhood
(Beck, 2011) and formed into early concepts about self and
others grouped into three main categories of self-sufficiency,
lovability, and self-worth (Beck, 2011; Disner et al., 2011).
The concept of cognitive schemas was deduced from clinical
observations of depressed adults (Beck, 1964). According to
theory, cognitive schemas are composed of sets of related core
beliefs, and operate as stable, mainly latent templates for selective
recognition of information that supports one’s core beliefs,
while discounting contradictions (Beck, 2011). Neuroscience
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org
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mistreatment.
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BOX 6 | CBT in mood and anxiety syndromes and personality disorder.

BOX 6 | Continued

• CBT targets Beck’s cognitive hierarchy of schematized experiences
(automatic thoughts, core- and intermediate beliefs, higher order schemas)
(Beck, 2011; Disner et al., 2011) as units of intervention. Evaluative
“automatic thoughts” that arise in specific situations3 (e.g., facing
a new assignment at work), not a result of reasoning and usually
only phenomenally conscious, are associated with shifts in emotions,
motivation, physiological reactions, and behavior (Beck, 2011). Analysis
of aroused emotions in specific situations may uncover automatic
thoughts, maladaptive core beliefs, and higher-order schemas that
underlie depression and anxiety syndromes. Despite negative selfappraisal, depressed or anxious individuals usually have a coherent identity,
moral values, empathy, theory of mind, adaptive character traits, and
prosocial behaviors. Maladaptive core beliefs may have been formed and
superposed upon integrated object relations, perhaps in children who
for any reason have not worked through the anxieties of depressive
position into self- and object-constancy. These children experience envy,
guilt, ambivalence, aggression, and fear of losing important objects. In
older children and adults, social adversity or trauma, such as sibling
rivalry, school bullying, adult abuse, singly or in concert with genetic
dispositions to anxiety and depression, may cause regressive undoing
of self-constancy and increase the likelihood of maladaptive core beliefs
and schemas in social or interpersonal situations. Such children/adults
are susceptible to negative self-appraisals, usually around themes of
unlovability, worthlessness, or vulnerability to harm. CBT has proven
effective (Dugas and Robichaud, 2007; Beck, 2011) and, with some
disorder-specific modifications, is treatment of choice (Stewart and
Chambless, 2009) in bona fide depression and anxiety syndromes (i.e.,
with no underlying partial object relations as in personality disorder). Once
maladaptive beliefs and schemas that perpetuate depression and anxiety
are “unlearned” through CBT exercises, self- and object-constancy may
be restored and more functional core beliefs and schemas developed
(Beck, 2011). A metanalysis of CBT in Major Depression shows a relapselowering effect superior to antidepressants; the effect continues even after
acute CBT was discontinued (Leichsenring and Leibing, 2003), much
like psychodynamic therapy continues to benefit patients with personality
disorder after therapy completion (Shedler, 2010).

(Young et al., 2003). SFT is tailored to the development of secure attachment
to the therapist (suggestive of achieved integration of object relations)
while at the same time correcting dysfunctional attitudes via standard CBT
techniques. Such trans-theoretical multifocal approaches (Prochaska and
Norcross, 2009) may help explain the real-time and long-term efficacy of
SFT in personality disorder, with benefits persisting after therapy completion
in a self-perpetuating manner (Giesen-Bloo et al., 2006). The author’s claim
that SFT is superior to transference-focused therapy of personality disorder
has been challenged (Yeomans, 2007). Important here is that SFT, the most
“psychodynamized” of CBTs, shows more efficacy than unmodified CBT in
personality disorder.
3 In contrast to intermediate beliefs which are active as general rules, attitudes,
and assumptions, across situations and relationships, as noted.

2011; Tonegawa et al., 2018), which seems to be the main
hub for generalizing self-related knowledge based on past
experience. Affect-memory is provided by the amygdala input
to mPFC (Kitamura et al., 2017) and from here into working
memory (Smith et al., 2018). Given the self-reinforcing patterns
of schema updates, core beliefs are strongly influenced, but
not predetermined22 by the antecedent implicit schema of
object relations.
A developmental transition between finalization of object
relations and emergence of core beliefs occurs between 2 and
4 years of age. During this period, the attainment of self- and
object-constancy is paralleled by capacity for self-referenced
cognition, self-reflection, introspection, and abstract appraisals of
self and others (Tahka, 1988; Disner et al., 2011). These valuations
can be adaptive, i.e., with a positive affective valence (“I am
worthy,” “People are helpful”) likely reflecting the continuum
from self-constancy to positive self-appraisals in the context of
good-enough parenting and/or constitutionally tempered affects.
Core-beliefs with negative affective valence are maladaptive
or dysfunctional (e.g., “I am incompetent,” “I am unlikable”).
Maladaptive core beliefs do not necessarily reflect pathology of
object relations (Box 6).
Core-, intermediate beliefs,23 and cognitive schemas are
generally considered to be implicit. However, core beliefs can
reach phenomenal self-awareness, passively noticed (“felt to
be true”), as “something that it is like for one to be in a
particular mental state” (LeDoux and Brown, 2017), or in Beck’s
(1987) words, just the way things “are.” They are uncovered
through CBT-methods (journaling of emotional reactions and
automatic thoughts across related situations) or by careful
self-introspection.

• Meta-analyses of CBT vs. psychodynamic therapy for personality
disorder show mixed results, from comparable short-term effectiveness
(Leichsenring and Leibing, 2003) to longer-term CBT inferiority (Shedler,
2010, Table 1). Maladaptive attitudes in personality disorder are
epiphenomena, molded by fantasized compensatory self-image,
not real experience. Once subtype-specific attitudes (arrogance,
entitlement, theatricality, and antisociality) are corrected by CBT (real-time
effectiveness), there still remain underlying survival- and safety-level
anxieties that prioritize the relevance of one’s own fragility and real or
perceived rejection in comparison to which all other experiences are
of secondary importance. Such continuing influence may reactivate
the need for compensation, as the correction of maladaptive attitudes
leaves the individual defenseless against the deeply rooted sense of
endangerment and rejection. Thus, unmodified CBT is a symptom-based
therapy of personality disorder, as it treats epiphenomena rather than the
preconceptual core of the syndrome.
• To improve CBT for personality disorder, Beck himself (Beck et al., 2004)
proposed a tripartite approach, combining rational analysis, analysis of
development via emotional recollections, and examination of beliefs within
a warm relationship with a therapist. Young et al. (Young et al., 2003)
raised this proposal to another level by developing Schema Focused
Therapy (SFT) that combines CBT and psychodynamic approaches,
but also draws from Gestalt and attachment theories, humanistic
approaches, and emotion-focused therapy. SFT expands standard CBT
by emphasis on early emotional experiences, real or perceived inadequate
parenting, and relies on the healing influence of the therapeutic relationship
especially with respect to core needs for safety, nurturance, and protection
(Continued)
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22 Due to positive and negative intervening factors, environmental and genetic
(Beck, 2011; Kernberg, 2014).
23 Intermediate beliefs, defined as cognitively unarticulated attitudes, rules, and
assumptions that a person follows as a general approach to novel or challenging
situations, correspond to the concept of scripts in humanistic therapies, i.e., liferules (or traps) that develop between 2 and 5 years of age and forward (Berne,
1972).
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maladaptive schemas and related schema coping mechanisms
are considered, again much like partial object relations, to
form the core of personality disorder (Bernstein, 2005).
Schema coping mechanisms eventually become dominant
traits and automatic patterns of adult behavior (Young et al.,
2003), much like compensatory self-representations in object
relations theory of personality disorder. Young’s approach to
personality disorder brought closer Beck’s cognitive model
and object relations theory but used different words for
similar concepts.

Cognitive theory does not account for preconceptual traces
of adversity in infants and toddlers. In personality disorder,
chronic early adversity may lead to persisting dichotomization of
self- and object-representations that coexist as unsystematized,
predominantly negative fragments (Klein, 1935, 1946) reflecting
themes of endangerment and rejection. The priority of coping
with such urgency may interfere with the development of
self- and object-constancy, a known deficit in personality
disorder (Kernberg, 1975) and, down the time-line of complex
self-referential appraisals (core beliefs) (Box 6). These deficits
contribute to life-long identity diffusion typical of individuals
with personality disorder. In the context of an ill-defined,
fragmented sense of self and others, partial object relations are
manifested as diffuse concerns about own physical and mental
fragility, e.g., hypochondriasis, alternation between idealization
and devaluation of same significant objects, disintegration
anxiety, distrust, rejection sensitivity, among others (Svrakic and
Divac-Jovanovic, 2019). The early distressed mind resorts to
omnipotent fantasy to unilaterally fabricate a positive experience
as a focal point for continuing mind development. This creates
a compensatory self-image, specific for individual subtypes, e.g.,
narcissistic, schizoid, paranoid, histrionic, among others (Svrakic
and Divac-Jovanovic, 2019). Maladaptive attitudes about self
and others in personality disorder are epiphenomena. They
may resemble but are qualitatively different from core beliefs,
as they are molded by a fantasized, compensatory self-image
that organizes mental life and interpersonal relations, e.g., “I
have to be special” or “I have to impress” in narcissistic and
histrionic personalities, respectively (Beck et al., 2004). Novel or
challenging situations activate these compensatory attitudes to
protect the underlying anxieties of endangerment and rejection
(Svrakic and Divac-Jovanovic, 2019) which remain split off and
with no immediate impact on behavior.
The inability of cognitive theory to explain personality
disorder was first recognized by Young (1990) who hypothesized
that, rather than having “ordinary” maladaptive core beliefs,
individuals with personality disorder have “early maladaptive
schemas.”24 The latter are postulated to arise from unmet core
needs for safety, nurturance, and affection, and operate as
automatic, preconceptual, and non-conscious anticipation of
rejection, emotional deprivation, mistrust, and victimization
by others (Beck et al., 2004; Bernstein, 2005; Esmaeilian
et al., 2019), much like partial object relations. Young et al.
(2003) also describe non-conscious “early coping mechanisms”
that protect against intense affects associated with early
maladaptive schemas, much like the mentioned protective
fantasy compensates for partial object relations in personality
disorder. Young et al. (2003) compare the three coping
mechanisms to the evolutionary survival mechanisms of
“freeze, flight, or fight,” respectively, much like attachment
pathology associated with partial object relations. Early

PERSONALITY DISORDER: DEVELOPING
THE MIND WITH PARTIAL OBJECT
RELATIONS
In most cases of less-than-perfect parenting and/or heritably high
dispositions to affect- reactivity, developmental imperfections
are incorporated into the brain/mind which stay within the
quantitative range of normalcy. This common biological
phenomenon, known as “developmental homeostasis”
(Alcock, 2001), is achieved by multidirectional homeostatic
optimizations affecting all components of a complex selforganizing adaptive system (Bak, 1996; Svrakic et al., 1996;
Chan, 2001). However, heritably excessive negative affectreactivity, and/or bad-enough parenting, social adversity
and/or psychological trauma, during phase-sensitive periods
(Teicher and Samson, 2016), may overpower the brain’s/mind’s
homeostatic ability to assimilate imperfections. This may
result in brain and mind pathology of personality disorder, the
former exemplified by a hypo-functional PFC and amygdala
hyper-sensitivity to negative affects (Teicher and Samson,
2016), the latter by pathological persistence of dyadic selfand object-representations, which remain unsystematized
and coexist as split off fragments in the mind (Svrakic and
Divac-Jovanovic, 2019). As persistent episodic memories
eventually are semanticized, it follows that uncontrollable
stress, re-experienced across multiple interactions with badenough caregivers, is extracted into a gist-like neocortical
schema (Tonegawa et al., 2018) with a net-valence of fear, here
of an endangered but helpless and rejected self-surrounded
by a distressing and unhelpful world of significant objects.
The phenomenology of personality disorder suggests that
the child searches for safety unilaterally, via non-conscious
primitive defense mechanisms, most notably via omnipotent
compensatory fantasy (Svrakic and Divac-Jovanovic, 2019).
Childhood precursors of personality disorder, including an
extreme, unrealistic sense of self, are observable as early
as 6-years-of-age (Uytun and Öztop, 2015). Winnicott
(1955) observed an omnipotent “false self ” in children as
a defensive organization developed to counter the threat of
annihilation by early adversity. We first discuss non-conscious
working memory where, we hypothesize, fantasy and other
defense mechanisms operate, and then introduce the concept
of homeostatic compensation as a mechanism underlying
personality disorder.

24 Young et al. (2003) use the phrase “early maladaptive” to contrast preconceptual

unarticulated schemas that correspond to partial object relations with “ordinary”
cognitively articulated maladaptive schemas of self and others, as in depression and
anxiety syndromes.

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

15

March 2021 | Volume 12 | Article 583743

Svrakic and Zorumski

Neuroscience of Object Relations

Non-conscious Working Memory: the
Hidden Layer of the Mind

reality by redefining the input (mature defenses), repressing it
(neurotic defenses), or polarizing it into less complex and thus
easier to manage dyads (splitting and other immature defenses)
(Svrakic and Divac-Jovanovic, 2019). Defense mechanisms have
been historically regarded as one of the non-conscious functions
of the Ego, otherwise considered to be largely conscious by
psychoanalysis. Freud drew from the principle of homeostasis
to formulate the concept of Ego as a “structure” within the
mind, rather than a general tendency, inherent to all selforganizing complex adaptive systems in biology, toward a
relatively stable equilibrium between interdependent elements;
this makes Ego a non-conscious function of the mind as a
whole26 .

Non-conscious working memory is a largely uncharted territory
with a potentially major role in the assembly of mental life.
It has been referred to as the “foyer” of consciousness or the
“back-bone” for high-level cognition, because the maintenance
of non-consciously perceived information has been shown
to engage the PFC (Bergstrom and Eriksson, 2014), the
brain region instrumental for abstract cognition and conscious
working memory (Wang et al., 2006). Evidence for nonconscious working memory is growing (reviewed in LeDoux
and Brown, 2017). Using fMRI and transcranial magnetic
stimulation (TMS, Rose et al., 2016) demonstrated how neural
representation of an item in working memory drops to baseline
and the item appears forgotten when attention shifts away.
A targeted single pulse of TMS can produce a brief reemergence of the unattended item in focal attention. This
effect suggests that activity-silent mechanisms maintain nonconscious working memory or, in the author’s words, that
“information in working memory (outside of focal attention)
can be maintained in a latent state via mechanisms other than
sustained, elevated activity” (Rose et al., 2016, p. 1136). The
re-activation effect was found to occur for items participants
were informed would be relevant later in the trial, suggesting
that non-conscious representation is dynamic and susceptible to
teleological cognitive influences. Bergstrom and Eriksson (2018)
also found evidence for “cognitive control processes during
non-conscious memory recognition” (p. 3225). Artificial neural
networks utilized in machine learning contain a hidden layer
located between the input and output layers. The hidden layer
performs computations on weighted inputs (synaptic weights in
biological networks of neurons) and produces net-input based
on non-linear transformations. The net-input is applied with
activation functions to produce the output (now input for the
output layer) that is more or less fundamentally different from the
original input (“disjoint” and “convex” decisions, respectively)
(Huang et al., 2000). Such hidden layer (or layers)25 that appear
to exist in biological networks of neurons (Rose et al., 2016;
Bergstrom and Eriksson, 2018; Gonzales et al., 2018), might
host the operations of non-conscious working memory, most
notably the homeostatic optimization processes, the driving
force behind self-organization of complex dynamical systems in
biology and physics (Bak, 1996), including human personality
(Svrakic et al., 1996). One example of such homeostatic
optimization may be the concept of defense mechanisms as
defined by psychoanalysis. Covert but teleological cognitive
influences on information processing in non-conscious working
memory have been documented, as discussed. Such influence on
input information might be the mechanism of non-conscious
distortions of reality, i.e., “defense mechanisms,” that guard
against conscious representation of inner conflicts or intolerable

Neuropathology of Personality Disorder
Infants and children exposed to chronic severe stress
may develop phase sensitive, widespread, and enduring
neuropathological effects on vulnerable brain regions, notably
the hippocampus (Luby et al., 2013), and medial27 and
dorsolateral prefrontal cortices (Teicher and Samson, 2016),
coupled with a premature engagement of the amygdala in mental
processes (Tottenham, 2012), enhanced amygdala responsivity
to emotional stimuli, and diminished striatal response to
anticipated rewards (Teicher and Samson, 2016). Prefrontal
dysfunction (“hypofrontality”) is manifested as a suboptimal
top-down control of affects, deficits in working memory,
executive function, decreased capacity for mentalization
and theory of mind of others, lack of empathy and other
prosocial emotions (Preißler et al., 2010; Dimaggio et al., 2012;
Marini et al., 2016). Subcortical dysfunction is manifested as
amygdala-mediated hyper-sensitivity to negative emotions,
especially to signs of rejection, and lack of genuine interest in
commonly rewarding activities (Teicher and Samson, 2016),
such as parenting or work, among others. A strong amygdala
response in infancy, in the context of an immature mPFC and
its yet-to-develop inhibitory inputs on the amygdala affects,
has been shown to be mediated by caregivers (mother), either
accentuating affective responses (bad-enough caregivers) or
alleviating them (good-enough caregivers) (Tottenham, 2012).
In other words, a good-enough parent assumes the role of
mPFC while the latter is still not developed sufficiently. A
full maturation of amygdala-mPFC connectivity may take
two decades of interactive development, when amygdala
hyper-reactivity is top-down regulated by mPFC (reviewed in
Tottenham, 2012). Figuratively, the developing amygdala is “the
student of the world and a teacher of the cortex” (Tottenham
and Gabard-Durnam, 2017). The mPFC-amygdala circuitry
is commonly affected by early life stress (Tottenham, 2020).
Amygdala is rich in stress-hormone receptors that make it very
susceptible to stress especially in neonates (Tottenham, 2012).
In individuals with personality disorder, the mPFC does not
mature but continues to be “tutored” by the amygdala. In some

25 One

26 Conversely,

hidden layer keeps the output with some contact with reality (“convex
decisions”), much like in defense mechanisms, which is in biological networks
preferred over being disjointed from reality (Huang et al., 2000) (bizarre outputs)
as in psychosis (here, perhaps 2 hidden layers operate due to widespread
aberrancies in brain organization).
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the Id is increasingly viewed as being conscious (Solms, 2013).

27 The pivotal role of mPFC in integrated object relations is implicated by studies of

adults with personality disorder in whom structural and functional abnormalities
of mPFC, among other neuropathology, are reported (Krause-Utz et al., 2014;
Salvador et al., 2016; Teicher and Samson, 2016).
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self-and object-images. Learned safety in rodents has been shown
to promote neurogenesis in the hippocampus and to modulate
monoaminergic genes in the basolateral amygdala (Pollak et al.,
2008). With this in mind, it plausible that variant-specific,
fantasized compensatory self-images in humans with personality
disorder also have a neural substrate, e.g., as schematized
variant-specific behaviors and emotions (narcissistic, histrionic,
etc.) across situations, potentially explaining the relative stability
of such images over time.
Based on research in animals (Tse et al., 2011) and humans
(van Kesteren and Meeter, 2020), the inaugural schema-affectencodings of early adversity are likely to thereafter implicitly
promote preferential assimilation of perceived rejection,
while positive experiences are assimilated as exceptions.
As such, partial object relations interfere with normal selforganization of functional connectivity networks that underlie
mental faculties, rendering thought, emotion, and motivation
dichotomized, alternating between decompensated (e.g., anxieties
about one’s own ability and safety, paranoid interpretation
of the environment, aggressive-destructive tendencies toward
significant objects) and compensated (when fantasized selfimagery is sufficient to organize the mind while awareness
of own vulnerability to rejection is only vaguely recognized)
(Svrakic and Divac-Jovanovic, 2019). The shifts between
regressive and compensated functioning usually occur in highvs. low-stress situations and unstructured (destabilizing) and
structured (stabilizing) environments, respectively (Svrakic and
Divac-Jovanovic, 2019).

cases, chronic stress occurring after a good-enough childhood
may damage established functional connectivity by increased
olygodendrogenesis and reduction in neurogenesis in the
hippocampus, a super-hub in many functional networks (Chetty
et al., 2014). Such “fracturing” of functional connectivity may
explain cases of personality disorder arising later in development.

Homeostatic Compensation Through
Fantasy as the Potential Mechanism of
Personality Disorder
Personality disorder may result from a homeostatic attempt
of the early brain/mind to compensate for the predominance
of negative self- and object-representations associated with
survival- and safety-level anxieties (Svrakic and DivacJovanovic, 2019), an adaptive response to facilitate survival
and reproduction in the face of adversity (Teicher and Samson,
2016), the latter frequently perpetrated by caregivers. The lack
of an available caregiver to provide comfort may be a critical
to make these experiences overwhelming or traumatic (Lane
et al., 2015). In such a context, the sense of safety must be
created by compensatory mechanisms, a common strategy
in brain and mental functioning (Fassbender and Schweitzer,
2006). Due to stress-induced early prefrontal dysfunction,
suppression of distressing memories, a healthy prefrontal
mechanism mediating resilience after trauma (Mary et al.,
2020), is ineffective. Instead, the drop in fitness may drive
the distressed mind toward omnipotent fantasy (Svrakic and
Divac-Jovanovic, 2019) and other survival-type adaptations,
such as preference for interpersonal distance (Maier et al.,
2020)28 . Such homeostatic maneuvering staves off the risk of
disintegration but shunts the developing mind into the deviance
of unrealistic self-image and maladaptive expectations of support
for this image in interpersonal relationships. Together, such
intra- and interpersonal dynamics create the characteristic
phenomenology and symptoms of personality disorder (Svrakic
and Divac-Jovanovic, 2019)29 . The wishful imagery and
revengeful affects of omnipotent fantasy unilaterally fabricate
the sense of control over malevolent objects and adversity.
The process can be conceived as unilateral conditioning of
fear inhibition by fantasized safety, akin to “learned safety,”
a protective learning process in animals exposed to adversity
to respond to signals of safety that can help prevent and
reverse chronic stress (Pollak et al., 2008). Fantasy is driven by
homeostatic optimization processes to restore the equilibrium
within the mind at risk of disintegration rather than by real
experience. As a defensive mechanism most likely operating
in non-conscious working memory, above the level of neural
encoding of real experience, fantasy can compensate for negative
representations but cannot transform them into actual positive

NEUROSCIENCE OF PSYCHODYNAMIC
PSYCHOTHERAPY
All individual variants of personality disorder share the same core
deficit of partial object relations, alternatively called “borderline
personality organization” (Kernberg, 1975) or “fragmented
personality” (Svrakic and Divac-Jovanovic, 2019), while differing
with respect to the compensatory self-image, e.g., narcissistic,
schizoid, paranoid, among other subtypes. Personality disorder
is, thus, considered a deficit-type psychopathology because the
dichotomized mind is attempting to amalgamate itself against
disintegration30 . In search of an effective approach to restructure
implicit partial object relations, a number of psychotherapies
have been adapted for personality disorder, but in retrospect, the
psychodynamic framework remains a key underlying approach
(Shedler, 2010; Magnavita, 2012). When transcripts and video
recordings of session are analyzed, regardless of the therapy
the therapist believed was being administered, the therapist’s
adherence to the psychodynamic prototype predicts successful
outcome in both psychodynamic and CBT approaches to
personality disorder (Shedler, 2010).

28 This

refers to emotional but not physical interpersonal distance, as others are
vitally needed, frequently demanded, to validate the unrealistic self-image of the
patient, hence the frequent interpersonal conflicts (Svrakic and Divac-Jovanovic,
2019).
29 Despite suggestions for a possible link between specific traumas in childhood
and the risk of specific phenomenology of personality disorder, e.g., narcissistic,
schizoid, etc. (Hankin and Abela, 2005) such causal relationship has not been
established.
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Clinical Data
Meta-analyses of controlled studies of long-term psychodynamic
psychotherapy of personality disorder demonstrate substantial
30 In contrast to the surplus-type psychopathology of neuroses, by which the mind
defends itself against the surplus of anxiety.
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switch and engramize a positive-valence content-context
(e.g., rewarding female presence, home cage) and drive
home-cage preference (Redondo et al., 2014). The switched
hippocampal processing engages amygdala partners that
encode the corresponding affect-memory (now reward),
while in parallel weakening original connections with
negative affect-memory (Redondo et al., 2014). The
mPFC, informed by inputs from the hippocampus and
amygdala, (i) system-consolidates these new positive
episodic memories (Kitamura et al., 2017) and (ii) is
believed to form a schema-affect template hat thereafter
directs attentional priorities to Gunseli and Aly (2020),
regulates relevance, and guides preferential assimilation of
positive experiences (Tse et al., 2011) while discounting
contradictions, as discussed. The neural substrate of such
dynamic system-level adaptive flexibility of memory-based
implicit schemas is unknown. It likely involves, among
others, immediate early genes (Tse et al., 2011; Tonegawa
et al., 2018), epigenetic modifications (Tonegawa et al.,
2018), mPFC neurons phase-locking to hippocampal thetarhytms (Siapas et al., 2005), and sharp-wave ripple-mediated
replay of activity of hippocampal engrams occurring in
temporal proximity with cortical delta activity during slowwave sleep (Çalişkan and Stork, 2018).
(ii) Functionally distinct neuron ensembles within a single
memory engram in the hippocampus promote adaptive
generalization or discrimination of that memory in
changing environments (Sun et al., 2020). Such functional
heterogeneity within a single engram is thought to represent
a “higher order” memory trace within the “essential
memory trace,” the former enabling adaptive regulation
of memory-guided behavior in environments that are
accordant or discordant with the memory (Sun et al.,
2020). In rodents, neurons genetically defined by Fosdependent transcription and receiving excitatory cortical
synaptic input, promote memory generalization in the
context of accordant new experiences. In contrast, other
neurons within the same engram but genetically defined
by Npas-432 and receiving inhibitory synaptic inputs from
local interneurons, mediate discrimination of the same
memory in the context of discordant new experiences (Sun
et al., 2020).
(iii) Remapping of hippocampal engrams that encode context
and content reflects subjective beliefs about the hidden
states of environment (“hidden state inference”), rather
than objective, observable properties of the environment
(Sanders et al., 2020). Hidden states are inferred from
observations that are based on and thus also biased by prior
experience (safety, danger). The regularity of a hidden state
can be learned over the course of experience, leading to
increased certainty about hidden state assignments (Sanders
et al., 2020).

improvements in general mental functioning and discrete
symptoms, such as impulsivity and interpersonal functioning
(Leichsenring and Rabung, 2008; Magnavita, 2012).
Psychodynamic therapy has been associated with sustained
maturation of primitive defense mechanisms (Bond and Perry,
2004), one of the three hallmarks of partial object relations31 .
Other studies (Levy et al., 2006) show that transference focused
psychodynamic psychotherapy, but not dialectic behavior
therapy or modified psychodynamic support, is associated
with significant transitions to secure attachment and improved
reflective function. The cited results are suggestive of cognitive
integration of partial object relations, likely mediated by
improved organization of mPFC and its top-down regulation
of emotion, as supported by neuroimaging (Lai et al., 2007;
Perez et al., 2016). Brain fMRIs of individuals with borderline
personality after transference focused therapy showed a positive
correlation between improvements in affective lability and left
posterior-medial orbitofrontal cortex/ventral striatum activation,
and a negative correlation with right amygdala/parahippocampal
activation (Perez et al., 2016). The benefits of long-term
psychodynamic therapy not only continue after therapy is
completed but also tend to increase over time in a selfperpetuating fashion (Shedler, 2010). In contrast, the benefits
of non-psychodynamic but real-time effective therapies, such as
CBT, tend to dissipate over time (Shedler, 2010, Box 6).

Potential Neural Mechanisms of
Psychodynamic Psychotherapy
Advancing cognitive- and systems-neuroscience of episodic
memory has identified patterns of information processing in
cortical (schematic) and subcortical (emotional) learning and
memory systems that dynamically interact to mediate widespread
neural and mental adaptations to changing environments.
Independently acquired units of knowledge on this subject
may help outline a plausible scenario for neural mechanisms
of psychodynamic psychotherapy. Some of these findings have
already been discussed, e.g., encoding and semanticization
of enhanced episodic memories, schema-expansion patterns
(Box 3), some are discussed below.
(i)

Central to our discussion is the dynamic and reversible
plasticity of the hippocampal-amygdala-mPFC circuitry
involved in encoding and systems-consolidation of affectenhanced memories (Tonegawa et al., 2018). Distinct
groups of amygdala neurons are genetically programmed
to encode either fear or rewarding affects (Kim et al.,
2016). These groups are anti-correlated (processing reward
supresses processing in fear-dedicated neurons and vice
versa (Kim et al., 2016) and fixed in dedication (i.e.,
cannot be re-trained to engramize affects not in accord
with their program, Redondo et al., 2014). In contrast,
hippocampal engrams that encode a semantic-like content
(e.g., “what” – an aversive event), context (e.g., home
cage), and drive avoidant behaviors, can be re-trained to

31 The other two are identity diffusion and subtle impairments in reality testing
(Kernberg, 1975).
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32 N-pas4,

an immediate early gene encoding a transcription factor Neuronal PAS
domain-containing protein 4 that controls inhibitory synapses.
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CEE (a concept of Alexander, 1950) refers to the healing aspect
of psychodynamic therapy that works alongside interpretation
and insight. CEE is a form of implicit emotional learning
within the relationship with a significant object (the therapist)
that could not have occurred outside the treatment setting
(Christian et al., 2012)34 . The relationship is characterized by
the therapist’s unconditional, empathic, and expert presence
in the therapeutic process (figuratively, a good-enough third
parent). The implicit anticipation of endangerment and rejection
is activated within a safe, helpful, and empathic significant
relationship. Once controversial, CEE has regained scientific
interest (Christian et al., 2012). Its mechanism is still debated.
One possibility is that learning of safety and acceptance within
the therapeutic relationship occurs at a procedural or subsymbolic level (Christian et al., 2012). As noted, the primordial
negative schema-affects complex of partial object relations is
automatically activated in transference. Such activation, albeit
non-conscious, might make the implicit schema destabilized
and open to updates (Lee et al., 2017). The mentioned
thalamus-amygdala short-cut may be pivotal for such updates.
Amygdala engages mPFC (anterior cingulate in particular)
during associative learning (Keefer and Petrovich, 2017). In
primates, an overall increased theta power and a directional phase
locking develops between amygdala spikes and anterior cingulate
input (local field potentials that are locked to theta band) and
declines once aversive memory is formed (Taub et al., 2018). This
unidirectional synchronization could be a plausible mechanism
to transform CEE into an implicit amygdala input to mPFC, and
update (reconstruct) the implicit schema of endangerment and
rejection, acquired decades earlier at the same sub-symbolic level
and in a similar setting.
Another mechanism of CEE could involve metaplasticity,
defined as activity-dependent and persistent regulation
(“priming”) of the ability of synapses to induce subsequent
plasticity, i.e., long-term potentiation or depression, figuratively
“plasticity of synaptic plasticity.” Metaplasticity mediates
adaptive changes in the interneuron network that controls
principal neuron activity and generates behaviorally-relevant
local field potentials in the hippocampus-amygdala-mPFC hubs
at different phases of emotional learning (reviewed in Çalişkan
and Stork, 2018). Changes in the interneuron network may
induce metaplasticity by (i) generally altering the oscillation
characteristics in the local circuit and their synchrony with
the target regions, and (ii) by controlling engram formation
and their participation in the local circuitry (Çalişkan and
Stork, 2018). In therapy, implicit experience of safety and
acceptance may prime the hippocampus-amygdala-mPFC
memory system to preferentially process emotionally positive
sub-symbolic experiences.
In humans and animals, research has implicated the
hippocampus-amygdala-vmPFC network in both extinction and
cognitive reappraisal of emotional stimuli (Phelps and LeDoux,
2005). As noted, the benefits of unmodified CBT in personality

(iv) Cortically schematized enhanced episodic memories
are strongly associated with respective amygdala affectmemories (schema-affect complexes) (Kitamura et al.,
2017). Evidence from cognitive neuroscience (Talmi et al.,
2019) indicates that emotion-enhanced episodic memories
can be activated by affective clues (bottom-up activation)
perhaps involving the sensory cortices-thalamus-amygdala
“short-cut” (Phelps and LeDoux, 2005) as well as by
natural relatedness (semantic clues) likely involving the
sensory
cortices-thalamus-mPFC-amygdala
pathway
(Kitamura et al., 2017). Primordial schema-affect units of
object relations are non-declarative, i.e., not accessible by
attention and conscious working memory. The thalamusamygdala short-cut allows sensory stimuli to activate affects
in parallel or before the signal arrives to the cortex, and
may be important for precognitive emotional processing
(LeDoux, 1992) that in turn may provide implicit access to
the implicit schema-affect units of early object relations.
It is unknown but plausible that the above cortical and subcortical
mechanisms work in concert, i.e., that they dynamically interact
to achieve multidirectional cognitive-affective reconfigurations
of the brain and mind as a flexible adaptive response to persistent
new episodic experience.

Psychodynamic Interventions
The main “tools” of psychodynamic psychotherapy are
transference interpretation and corrective emotional experience
(CEE). Transference33 interpretation is used to uncover implicit
anticipation of rejection as it is directed toward the therapist
in the here-and-now or, alternatively, to uncover repetitions of
conflictual past relationships in the here-and-now (Auchincloss
and Samberg, 2012). In either case, transference interpretation
may lead to insights, considered to be fundamental to the
therapeutic effect. Insights are defined as sudden, catharsis-like
intuitive apprehending of inner nature of things that makes
non-conscious mental life accessible to conscious understanding
(Auchincloss and Samberg, 2012). The therapeutic mechanism
of insights is unknown. It is generally believed that individuals
with personality disorder non-consciously activate partial object
relations (that is anticipation of endangerment and rejection)
in transference. One possibility is that such catharsis-like
(emotional) understanding of inner nature of how one’s mind
operates at its core may destabilize and implicitly update
(restructure) the forgotten emotional memories of infancy and
toddlerhood via amygdala-mPFC input (discussed below).
33 Transference

refers to implicit ways of relating to significant objects, or
implicit anticipations and automatized behaviors derived from early object
relations (Auchincloss and Samberg, 2012). Transference is regularly enacted with
selective significant objects in adulthood, including the therapist, who is drawn
into playing a role that reflects the patient’s internal world (Gabbard, 2020).
Countertransference refers to the therapist’s conscious and nonconscious reactions
to the patient’s transference (Auchincloss and Samberg, 2012) and is therefore
jointly created by both parties (Gabbard, 2020). Counter-transference analysis is
also a useful source of information, either in terms of understanding the patient’s
nonconscious world or for insight into how the patient generally affects other
people.

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

34 A rare exception may be a mature romantic partner with unconditional love, who
receives, processes, and responds to primitive defense mechanisms in a therapeutic
fashion (partner as intuitive therapist).
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disorder tend to dissipate with time (Shedler, 2010). The same
hippocampus-amygdala-mPFC network is believed to mediate
benefits of psychodynamic therapy, but here benefits tend to
continue and increase after therapy completion. It appears that
transference interpretation and insights, coupled with implicit
corrective emotional experience, both unique to psychodynamic
therapy, make the difference between the two approaches to
personality disorder.

object-specific but experience-specific, as episodic memories
of particular events have been forgotten. Negative experiences
may be discriminated against as early as at the level of
hippocampus-amygdala processing (Sun et al., 2020), and may
lead to increased certainty of assignments about hidden state
of the environment (Sanders et al., 2020), now expected to
be positive.

Disruption of Reconsolidation: A Plausible
Intervention-Mechanism Scenario of Psychodynamic
Therapy

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
A key going forward concerns testable research directions that
flow logically from our model and discussion to (a) enhance
mental health, (b) prevent, and (c) improve treatment of many
forms of mental disorder, personality pathology in particular.
Some directions for research include:

Early in therapy, the existing implicit schema of partial object
relations, typically accentuates the relevance of and selectively
prepares attention toward rejection and distrust (Tse et al., 2011;
Gunseli and Aly, 2020). Positive experiences are assimilated as
exceptions and may be even discriminated against (Sun et al.,
2020). Each time these negative schema-affect complexes are
activated in therapy, the overlaps (i.e., perceived rejection) reconsolidate the existing schema. Nevertheless, persistent positive
episodes, explicit (e.g., transference interpretation and insights)
and implicit (e.g., corrective emotional sense of safety and
acceptance) are mediated by a significant object (the therapist)
in the context of positive primary affects (care). The latter
may be encoded via the mentioned thalamic-amygdala shortcut.
Amygdala spiking associated with positive emotional experience
may phase-couple with mPFC theta oscillations and become
an emotional implicit input (Taub et al., 2018). Additionally,
persistent environment of safety and acceptance may prime
the hippocampus-amygdala-mPFC memory system to selectively
process emotionally positive experiences via metaplasticity
(Çalişkan and Stork, 2018). Such implicit emotional learning
may not only disrupt chronic reconsolidation of endangerment
and rejection, but also may re-construct (update) the netnegative schema of partial object relations toward a netpositive valence (van Kesteren and Meeter, 2020). As mPFC
is a key hub in functional networks that underlie mental
faculties, such selectivity toward safety and acceptance may
become a stable attractor for the maturation of these networks
“from within,” much like partial object relations interfered
with normal brain/mind development during phase-sensitive
periods of infancy and toddlerhood. The process of change
likely follows Bayesian dynamics, i.e., the more sub-symbolic
evidence for safety and acceptance – the higher the probability
of emotional learning and cognitive network maturation. It
follows that many repetitions of implicit experience of safety
and acceptance are needed for CEE to occur. In other words,
integration of object relations in psychodynamic therapy is
not new learning inhibiting but not eliminating old learning
(as appears to be in CBT-mediated extinction) (Phelps and
LeDoux, 2005) but restructured old emotional learning; this
may explain the post-therapy continuation of benefits in a
self-perpetuating fashion (Shedler, 2010). Once established as
predominant, integrated object relations tend to promote own
expansion by preparatory attention toward and preferential
assimilation of positive representations of self and others in
all significant relationships. Such generalization is possible
because the master schema of early object relations is not
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org
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determining how to maximize healthy plasticity of
critical neurocircuits to enhance well-being perhaps via
neurogenesis [e.g., diet, exercise (Hueston et al., 2017; Liu
and Nusslock, 2018), mindfulness (Hölzel et al., 2011),
other approaches to stress reduction];
determining
how
to
augment
psychodynamic
psychotherapy by co-treatments that enhance plasticity
[(e.g., the mentioned stress-reduction strategies,
psychedelics combined with psychotherapy (Svrakic
et al., 2019); other pharmacological treatments
targeted to mechanisms underlying synaptic plasticity,
including positive modulators of NMDA receptors,
or neurostimulation, particularly trancranial magnetic
stimulation targeting neural circuits underlying attention
and memory (Marshall et al., 2006; Bourzac, 2016)];
determining how to integrate other modifying influences
to enhance mental health or ameliorate psychopathology,
notably hormonal [(e.g., oxytocin (Heinrichs and
Domes, 2008)] and epigenetic approaches [e.g., enriched
environments (Veena et al., 2008)];
determining how to promote transgenerational
transmission of epigenetic modifications produced by
psychotherapy, which opens up new perspectives for
prevention science (Jimenez et al., 2018);
determining the optimal ratio of transtheoretical
psychotherapy methods to promote integration of partial
object relations (the main goal) while at the same time
addressing the remaining compensatory phenomenology
and behaviors (integrated object relations are expected
to reduce the need for such compensation, but some
pathological habits may persist as hardwired schemas, as
discussed). Based on available evidence, such multifocal
approach (Prochaska and Norcross, 2009) should, at
the minimum, include CBT, psychodynamic, relational,
interpersonal and experiential methods. Manualization
of such therapy would standardize treatments across
therapists and facilitate research;
determining whether we can take advantage of enhanced
plasticity in the developing human brain for preventive
purposes. Work in infants and toddlers is already
identifying early predictors of individuals at risk for
psychopathology that may inform early intervention (Luby
March 2021 | Volume 12 | Article 583743
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LIMITATIONS

et al., 2020). Interventions focused on promoting parentchild interactions and cognitive/emotional development
can potentially use developmental plasticity in a specific
fashion to dampen, if not prevent defects that underlie
personality disorder and other forms of psychopathology
(Luby et al., 2020). Some prophylactic interventions
could be implemented by informed parents and public
policy as well, a bench-to-bedside expanded to homeand-public guidelines for childrearing. Such evidence-based
guidelines are surprisingly rare and much is left to the
belief systems of parents, frequently reflecting the parents’
childhood experience as to how their own affectivelycharged situations were handled. Some inconsistencies
are as basic as whether or not to let the infants cry
themselves to sleep. A wrong strategy here may potentially
have life-changing mental outcomes for children. Early life
intervention also offers hope of preventing dysfunction
associated with abuse, neglect and adversity that in many
instances are-direct normal brain and mind trajectories
toward personality disorder.

Contextual fear conditioning may have its limitations to
fully represent episodic memory (Dunsmoor and Kroes,
2019). However, real world emotional experiences likely
engage Pavlovian classical conditioning and episodic memory
mechanisms (Dunsmoor and Kroes, 2019). Recombinant DNA
and optogenetic studies demonstrate that contextual fear
conditioning may share neurobiological systems involved in
classical conditioning and episodic memory. The conditioned
context (location in the cage) paired with unconditioned
stimulus (foot shock) are initially encoded by the hippocampus,
while the memory of fear is encoded by the amygdala
which also drives avoidant behavior; the episode is systemconsolidated in mPFC (Kitamura et al., 2017). Remote memory
expressed by the mPFC engram was “conditioned-context
specific, suggesting that it is episodic-like” (Kitamura et al.,
2017, p. 5), a position of Eichenbaum (2017) as well. This
research raises the possibility that contextual fear conditioning
may be conceived as a simple form of episodic memory.

This research is of high priority because personality disorder,
a relatively severe but preventable and reversible brain and
mind dysfunction, is common (Lenzenweger et al., 2007) and
associated with comorbidity with other mental disorders (which
are usually treatment-resistant in this setting), and with a host
of family, parenting, and social problems (dysfunctional families,
child-abuse, distorted or atypical parenting, addictions, crime,
etc.) (Pincus and Wiggins, 1990; Stepp et al., 2011; Juurlink et al.,
2018).Thus, efforts to harness advancing neuroscience to enhance
well-being as well as to correct the dysfunction outlined in this
perspective can have major public health impact.
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